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FIGHTING THE RESOURCE CURSE: THE RIGHTS OF
CITIZENS OVER NATURAL RESOURCES
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ABSTRACT—Respect for the rights of peoples over natural resources is
crucial for the flourishing of communities and states. This article confirms
that international law ascribes robust resource rights both to indigenous
peoples and to citizens of independent states. These resource rights include
indigenous peoples’ right to free, prior, and informed consent and citizens’
rights that resource revenues are never used corruptly but are used first to
secure their means of subsistence. Resource rights are human rights, respect
for which requires substantial reforms in the practices of corporations and
investors as well as in the laws of resource-importing and resource-exporting
states.
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INTRODUCTION
Improving humanity’s use of Earth’s natural resources must be a top
international priority. Today’s climate crisis is one reason. Another is that,
in many countries, resources benefit the few at the expense of the many.
Absent accountability to the people of a territory, a rich natural resource
endowment can be a curse. Most authoritarian regimes today are in resource-
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rich states.1 Most highly corrupt regimes are in resource-rich states.2 Most
civil wars today are in resource-rich states,3 most of the worst hunger crises
are in these states,4 and most refugees today are fleeing from these states.5
And, strikingly, most of the world’s severe poverty will soon be in resourcerich states.6
While these are only correlations, the preponderance of social scientific
research supports causal connections.7 For example, in the developing world,
oil states are fifty percent more likely than non-oil states to be ruled by
authoritarian regimes, and twice as likely to suffer armed civil conflict.8
Moreover, in contrast to states that are not primary producers, the major oil
states outside the West have gone decades becoming no richer, freer, or more
peaceful than they were in 1980.9
Vast revenues are flowing into resource-exporting states, in the Middle
East, the former Soviet Union, Africa, and the Americas. Crude oil exports
alone were worth an enormous $1.1 trillion in 2019.10 Yet, where these
revenues are controlled by elites and armed groups, they fuel further
oppression, corruption, strife, and suffering. In Angola, for example,
1 See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, THE COMMODITIES ROLLER COASTER: A FISCAL
FRAMEWORK FOR UNCERTAIN TIMES 21 (2015); See FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 18-19
(2021) (displaying “authoritarian regimes” as “Not Free” states).
2 See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2019 3 (2020),
https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2019/results/table (displaying “corrupt regimes” as states with
corruption scores of 20 or below).
3 See UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, UPPSALA CONFLICT DATA PROGRAM,
http://www.ucdp.uu.se/downloads (lasted visited Jan 2, 2021) (showing civil conflicts that had over 1000
violent deaths in 2016-19).
4 See FOOD SECURITY INFORMATION NETWORK, GLOBAL REPORT ON FOOD CRISES 21 (2020)
https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000114546/download/ (listing the 10 worst food crises in
2019).
5 See Refugee Population by Country or Territory of Origin, THE WORLD BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sm.pop.refg.or?year_high_desc=true (last visited Dec. 28, 2020)
(providing the top eight refugee source countries in 2018).
6 See Share of the World’s Poor Living in Resource-Rich Countries May Peak at 75% in 2030,
BUSINESS A.M. (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.businessamlive.com/share-of-the-worlds-poor-living-inresource-rich-countries-may-peak-75-in-2030/ (predicting that most of the world’s severe poverty will be
in resource-rich states).
7 Wilson Prichard, Paola Salardi, & Paul Segal, Taxation, Non-Tax Revenue and Democracy: New
Evidence Using New Cross-Country Data, 109 WORLD DEV. 295 (2018); David Wiens, Paul Poast, &
William Roberts Clark, The Political Resource Curse: An Empirical Re-evaluation, 67 POL. RES. Q. 783
(2014); Michael Ross, What Have We Learned About the Resource Curse? 18 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 239
(2015).
8 MICHAEL ROSS, THE OIL CURSE: HOW PETROLEUM WEALTH SHAPES THE DEVELOPMENT OF
NATIONS 1 (2012).
9 Id.
10 Daniel Workman, Crude Oil Exports by Country, WORLD’S TOP EXPORTS (Jan. 3, 2020),
http://www.worldstopexports.com/worlds-top-oil-exports-country/.
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resource revenues sustained the power and wealth of corrupt state officials
while the children of the country died of poverty at the highest rate in the
world.11 In Azerbaijan, an unaccountable government has used resource
revenues for years forcefully to suppress protests of its policies.12 The oilfunded militants of ISIS and the mineral-funded militants in the Democratic
Republic of Congo have shown how non-state actors who sell off resources
can pay for the recruits and weapons needed to start or sustain civil conflict.13
The root problem in such cases, we argue, is that resources are exported
without accountability to the citizens of the state. Violations of
accountability are not only bad in themselves—they enable further violations
as state (and sometimes non-state) actors become empowered by resource
revenues to escape accountability in the future, often leading to further
human rights violations as well.14 By contrast, in states where citizens can
hold the state accountable for natural resource management, the risks of these
pathologies are substantially reduced.15 Accountable yet highly resourcedependent states, such as Norway with its oil and Botswana with its
diamonds, do not suffer the resource curse (indeed, they lead their regions in
peace and prosperity).16 Accountability to citizens for resource management
is crucial for the flourishing of individuals, communities, and whole regions
of the earth.17
International law can lead in lifting the resource curse. Under
international human rights law, citizens have fundamental rights over the
resources of their territory.18 This is firmly expressed in common Article 1

11

See RICARDO SOARES DE OLIVEIRA, MAGNIFICENT AND BEGGAR LAND: ANGOLA SINCE THE
CIVIL WAR 25-200 (2015); UNICEF, LEVELS & TRENDS IN CHILD MORTALITY 18-27 (2015).
12 See Azerbaijan Events of 2020, HUM. RTS. WATCH (2021), https://www.hrw.org/worldreport/2021/country-chapters/azerbaijan.
13 See LEIF WENAR, BLOOD OIL: TYRANTS, VIOLENCE, AND THE RULES THAT RUN THE WORLD 4864 (2017).
14 Id. at 17-47.
15 Id. at 14-20.
16 Id. at 11-16. (This article concerns the “political resource curses” of repression, corruption, and
conflict; there is also the macroeconomic phenomenon of slower growth in resource-rich states, not
discussed here, that is also called a “resource curse”).
17 AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS [ACHPR], State Reporting Guidelines
and Principles on Articles 21 and 24 of the African Charter Relating to Extractive Industries, Human
Rights and the Environment, ¶ 11 (May 22, 2017) (The African Commission defines “natural resources”
and “wealth” as referring respectively to “a people’s tangible and intangible possessions having socioeconomic value and to both the non-renewable resources including oil, gas and minerals and renewable
resources including surface and groundwater, wind, fauna and flora. Natural resources thus encompass
all assets or materials that constitute the natural capital of a nation.”); See Ramez Abubakr Badeeb, Hooi
Lean, & Jeremy Clark, The Evolution of the Natural Resource Curse Thesis: A Critical Literature Survey,
51 RESOURCES POL’Y 123 (2017).
18 JÉRÉMIE GILBERT, NATURAL RESOURCES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN APPRAISAL (2019).
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of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),
which states that:
All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth
and resources . . . In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of
subsistence.19

Moreover, both of the Covenants also reaffirm this right in their last
substantive article:
Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the
inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural
wealth and resources.20

Significantly, this is the only human right that is stated twice in the two
Covenants; no other Covenant right is reemphasized in this way. The
Covenants are, in turn, accepted by the preponderance of states. Ninety-eight
percent of the world’s population lives in a state that is party to at least one
of these treaties.21
Despite their prominence in the Covenants, the rights of peoples over
natural resources are neglected rights and the subjects of widespread
misunderstandings.22 For example, it is sometimes said that states are (or can
be) the only holders of rights over resources. Or it is said that states always
act in the interest of the people, whatever states may do with the territory’s
resources. Or it is said that popular ownership of resources requires “resource
nationalism” or that it forbids privatization. Such claims fail to register the
many developments in the international law of natural resources since World
War II. This article will show that international law regarding natural
19 G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1 (Dec. 16,
1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]; G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, art. 1 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICESCR]. Together referred to as the “Covenants”.
20 ICCPR, supra note 19, at art. 47; ICESCR, supra note 19, at art. 25.
21 Ratification of 18 International Human Rights Treaties, U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR
HUM. RTS., http://indicators.ohchr.org/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2020); Total Population by Country 2020,
WORLD POPULATION REV., http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2020).
These sets of data show that out of the 169 member states of the United Nations, more than six out of
seven states are party to at least one of the Covenants, including all of the states in the Americas, Europe,
and Africa (except South Sudan and some small islands) and nearly every state in Asia, including China
and India. Excluding states with populations of less than a million finds that 95 percent of states are party
to one of the Covenants.
22 Wenar, supra note 13, at 208-19; Jérémie Gilbert, The Right to Freely Dispose of Natural
Resources: Utopia or Forgotten Right? 31 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 314, 341 (2013).
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resources has evolved dramatically since 1945, ascribing ever more specific
and substantive rights to citizens.
This article first surveys the historical development of peoples’ rights
over resources in international law, highlighting the progress that has been
made across several domains. The article then explores how these rights can
be used to fight the resource curse, by securing for citizens powers of
accountability over their natural wealth.
Part I begins the historical study with the era of decolonization in the
1950s and 1960s, when national populations came to be recognized as having
rights against the exploitation of resources by foreign states. Part II explores
the 1990s and 2000s, when indigenous peoples gained significant rights to
resources within their ancestral territories and moved the debate from
theoretical issues to the practical specification of natural resource rights. Part
III then traces the evolution of the ascription of natural resource rights to all
the citizens of a state, which solidified the idea that the resources of the state
are the “birthright” of its population.
Building on this historical survey, Part IV analyzes the content of the
rights of citizens over natural resources, detailing the substantive,
procedural, and remedial dimensions of these rights. Part V then envisages a
world where the resource rights of peoples are respected. The focus here is
not only on reforms in resource-cursed states, but also on reforms in states
whose corporations operate in resource-cursed states (“corporate-home
states”) and in states that import resources from those states. The aim of these
reforms is for corporate-home states and resource-importing states to reduce
their contributions to the violation of the human rights of peoples in resourcecursed states, and to do so without running afoul of the principle of nonintervention in the affairs of other states.23 Indeed, corporate-home and
resource-importing states should believe that they are required to make such
reforms out of respect for human rights and the self-determination of
peoples.24
These reforms are required because the domestic legal default of every
state today is to allow its corporations to make deals with unaccountable
actors to exploit foreign resources, and to import resources that have been
extracted with no accountability to the people of the state of origin.25 These

23 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶¶ 4, 7; G.A. Res. 2131A (XX), Declaration on the Inadmissibility of
Intervention and Interference the Domestic Affairs of States (Dec. 21, 1965); G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV),
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970).
24 ICCPR, supra note 19, at Pmbl. (declaring an obligation of states under the UN Charter to promote
respect for and observance of human rights, including the self-determination of peoples).
25 See Leif Wenar, Coercion in Cross-Border Property Rights, 32 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 171 (2015).
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legal defaults drive the resource curse, as they send substantial (and
sometimes massive) revenues to authoritarian regimes, corrupt officials, and
armed groups, empowering them to escape accountability further.
Yet since human rights and self-determination require resource
management to be at least minimally accountable to citizens, these legal
defaults violate primary norms of international law. Indeed, if we take
seriously the Covenants’ propertarian language that each state’s resources
belong to its people, then these legal defaults authorize commercial dealings
with foreign actors who are entirely unaccountable to the owners of the
resources. That is, every state today is authorizing commercial deals for
goods stolen from their owners, the people. Using one established metric for
accountable governance finds that over fifty percent of the world’s traded
oil, worth hundreds of billions of dollars every year, should be considered to
be stolen goods.26
Human rights and self-determination require states to reform their
domestic laws to prohibit their corporations and importers from making
resource deals with foreign actors who are entirely unaccountable to their
citizens. Such reforms would require significant changes in transnational
practices regarding the extraction of and trade in natural resources. We
examine the challenges to responsible unilateral and multilateral adoption of
these reforms, drawing on historical parallels such as the strengthening of
transnational anti-corruption laws. We also touch on potential impacts of
reforms in related areas of transnational law, such as corporate regulation
and investor-state relations.
In all, this article will argue that an historical analysis of the
international law on peoples’ rights to natural resources supports the
ascription of robust rights over natural resources to the citizens of
independent states. The neglect of these fundamental rights creates a vicious
cycle that reinforces the resource curse; legal recognition for these rights is
vital for the lives of millions around the world today.
I.

THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES OVER NATURAL
RESOURCES

As the passages from the human rights Covenants show, peoples hold
rights over natural resources as part of their right to self-determination. Yet
this raises a special interpretive challenge, because international law also
recognizes the rights of states over natural resources. Sovereignty over
natural resources is traditionally one of the attributes of state sovereignty,
26 FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 1; Workman, supra note 10. Using the Freedom House “Not Free”
category as a measure of non-accountable governance, cross-referenced with the top 15 crude oil
exporting states.
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and the assumption under general international law is that state sovereignty
entails jurisdictional rights over resources within the territory.27 This dual
ascription of rights has been clarified and regimented through the historical
development of international law of natural resources, along several
dimensions.
A. Drafting History: From Decolonization to the New Economic Order
The dynamic between peoples’ and states’ rights over resources first
became vivid in 1952, when the UN General Assembly included in the draft
Covenants two paragraphs on the rights of peoples to political and economic
self-determination.28 International law regarding natural resources then
became partially bifurcated. Permanent sovereignty over natural resources
was primarily understood as an external right of state self-determination: a
right of a state vis-à-vis other states.29 This external right was emphasized in
many treaties and declarations, particularly in the post-colonial context
where inequitable contracts with foreign investors and the nationalization of
resources were significant issues.30
However, UN General Assembly Resolutions also continued to affirm
peoples’ internal rights of self-determination: the rights of peoples against
their own state. For example, in these resolutions peoples have often been
ascribed a right to benefit from their country’s natural resources.31 Nico
Schrijver suggests that this reflected the desire of many states to link selfdetermination to the realization of socio-economic rights during the human
rights codification process of the 1950s and 1960s.32
The separation of peoples’ and states’ rights can be seen in several UN
General Assembly resolutions that recognized permanent sovereignty as a
right of peoples as well as states. For example, Article 1 of the 1962 General
27 See NICO SCHRIJVER, SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES: BALANCING RIGHTS AND
DUTIES 48-50 (2007). State sovereignty over natural resources is limited by several duties, such as a duty
to take due care of the environment and a duty to settle transborder resource issues equitably.
28 G.A. Res. 54/5 (VI), Inclusion in the International Covenant or Covenants on Human Rights of
Article Relating to the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination (Feb. 5, 1952); see id. at 49-53. Chile
attempted to add a third paragraph that stated, “The right of peoples to self-determination shall also
include permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources.” Yet this formulation was
ultimately rejected, in part because the notion of sovereignty was deemed not applicable to peoples.
29 Wenar, supra note 13, at 174-89.
30 Lillian Aponte Miranda, The Role of International Law in Intrastate Natural Resource Allocation:
Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Peoples-Based Development, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 785, 79697 (2012).
31 G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, art. 1 (Dec. 14, 1962);
G.A. Res. 2158 (XXI), Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, art. 5 (Nov. 25, 1966); G.A. Res.
2692 (XXV), Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources of Developing Countries and Expansion of
Domestic Sources of Accumulation for Economic Development, art. 2 (Dec. 11, 1970).
32 Schrijver, supra note 27, at 295.
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Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources
asserts that, “[t]he right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over
their natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the interests of their
national development and of the well-being of the people of the State
concerned.”33
Concurrently, the human rights Covenants were being drafted in the
General Assembly. After long debates, the two articles quoted above—
common Article 1(2) of the ICCPR and ICESCR and the identical articles
47 of the ICCPR and 25 of the ICESCR—affirmed and then reaffirmed the
human rights of peoples over their natural resources.34 The Covenants were
adopted by the General Assembly in 1966, and came into force in 1976 after
the deposit of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification or accession.35
It is worth noting that through the early 1970s there were several
General Assembly resolutions on permanent sovereignty over natural
resources that did not refer to the rights of peoples. For example, the 1972
Resolution on the Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources of
Developing Countries reaffirmed the right of states to permanent sovereignty
but focused only on the right of states to be free from outside coercion.36
Similarly, the 1974 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International
Economic Order made no mention of the rights of peoples, again focusing
only upon states’ rights to sovereignty over natural resources as against other
states.37
Some have taken this pause in the 1970s to imply that the rights of
peoples are extinguished after the end of colonial rule. And it is correct that
the term “peoples” in international instruments can, and in the past often did,
refer to peoples under colonial occupation or trusteeship.38 For example, in
33

G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), supra note 31, art. 1 (This phrasing was reaffirmed only once in G.A. Res.
2692 (XXV), supra note 31, art. 2); G.A. Res. 2158 (XXI), supra note 31, art. 5 (Several further
resolutions dealing with permanent sovereignty do raise specific concerns for peoples as distinct from
states: for example, Article 5 of the 1966 General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over
Natural Resources requires states to take due regard of the development needs and objectives of the
people when engaging with foreign enterprises.)
34 ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 1(2), 47; ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 1(2), 25.
35 ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 49; ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 27.
36 G.A. Res. 3016 (XXVII), Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources of Developing
Countries, art. 1-2 (Dec. 18, 1972).
37 G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order
(May 1, 1974).
38 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June
21) (in 1971 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) affirmed the sovereignty of the Namibian people over
its natural resources against the mandatory administration of South Africa); G.A. Res. 2145 (XXI),
Question of South West Africa (Oct. 27, 1966). A UN Special Committee called Namibia’s natural
resources “the birthright of the Namibian people.” G.A. Res. 34/92, infra note 138.
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1989 the ICJ affirmed the importance of the right of the Nauruan people to
sovereignty over their natural resources before their independence from
Australia.39 Yet an “only colonial” interpretation of the rights of peoples has
been consistently rejected by authoritative sources.
For example, upon becoming parties to the ICESCR, both India and
Bangladesh attempted to limit the meaning of “peoples” in Article 1 to
peoples under some form of foreign domination. Yet their reservations were
firmly rejected by other state parties.40 Furthermore, the UN Human Rights
Committee (hereinafter HRC) has confirmed that Article 1 in the ICCPR
does not apply only to peoples living under foreign domination.41 As Rosalyn
Higgins writes, “[T]he idea has been consistently fostered by the Committee
on Human Rights, acting under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
that self-determination is of continuing applicability; and the idea has
undoubtedly taken a general hold.”42
The rights of peoples to internal self-determination are not “only
colonial.” Indeed, as we will see, these rights continued to develop and
solidify after the lull in the early 1970s.
39 Case Concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), Judgement, 1992 I.C.J.
(June 26); Case T‑512/12, Front Polisario v. Council, 2015 E.C.R. ¶¶ 207-08, 223-47 (in 2015 the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) annulled the part of a trade agreement between the European Union and
Morocco that pertained to Western Sahara, citing among other grounds a letter from the UN Legal
Counsel affirming permanent sovereignty over natural resources of the peoples of non-self-governing
territories).
40 ICESCR, Declarations and Reservations, Objections (Dec. 16, 1966), https://treaties.un.org/doc/
Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-3.en.pdf. India’s declaration was that the right of
self-determination applies “only to the peoples under foreign domination,” and that the words referring
to the right “do not apply to sovereign independent States or to a section of a people or nation - which is
the essence of national integrity.” Bangladesh’s declaration was that Article 1 is understood as applying
in “the historical context of colonial rule, administration, foreign domination, occupation and similar
situations.” Yet France’s objection was that India’s reservation “attaches conditions not provided for by
the Charter of the United Nations to the exercise of the right of self-determination.” Germany said that,
“Germany strongly objects . . . to the declaration made by the Republic of India in respect of Article 1 . . .
The right of self-determination . . . applies to all peoples and not only to those under foreign domination.”
Pakistan made a similar statement. Though the reservations are still registered, these strong objections to
attempts at narrowing the scope of the right show that many states understand the right as applying more
broadly than only to peoples under colonial occupation.
41 HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant:
Comments of the Human Rights Committee, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.38 (Aug. 3, 1994) (in 1994
the HRC criticized Azerbaijan’s narrow view of self-determination and declared that “under Article 1 of
the Covenant, that principle applies to all peoples, and not merely colonized peoples.”).
42 ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 11617 (1994) (“The Committee on Human Rights, when examining the report of a state party to the Covenant,
asks not only about any dependent territories that such a state party may be responsible for (external selfdetermination) but also about the opportunities that its own population has to determine its own political
and economic system (internal self-determination). Virtually no states refuse to respond to probing
comments and questions on internal self-determination, and the Committee is not told that no such right
exists. Rather, it is accepted that the right exists.”).
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B. Peoples as Holding and Exercising Rights
Before proceeding with the historical development of peoples’ rights, a
conceptual point that has puzzled many can be clarified. The proposition that
the human rights Covenants grant rights to peoples rests on the assumption
that peoples and states have separate legal personalities. Given the wording
of the Covenants and other international instruments, this is a plausible
proposition. Moreover, since all human rights are, in the first instance, rights
against the state, the Covenants appear to be asserting that peoples’ rights
over natural resources constrain the discretion of states in the management
of natural resources, putting limits on what a state may do in the name of
those who reside in its territory.
Historically, the proposition that peoples and states have separate legal
personalities has sometimes been denied.43 Moreover, even when the legal
personalities of peoples and states have been distinguished conceptually, it
was sometimes claimed that peoples either cannot hold or cannot exercise
rights independently of their state.44
This conceptual point is now settled: international law now affirms
decisively that peoples can hold and exercise rights independently of their
state. First, territorially defined groups can hold and exercise territorial
rights. For instance, a state may not legally transfer territory to another state
without the consent of the population of that territory, and the peoples of
independent territories such as Puerto Rico have an ongoing right to choose
their terms of association with the larger state.45 None of these rights can be
held by or exercised by the state in question, but only by the people.
Second, citizens are also capable of exercising rights independently of
their state through the exercise of rights to participate in government. Article
21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 25 of the
ICCPR both provide for the participation of every citizen in public affairs,
including the right to vote.46 Citizens’ collective rights to internal self43 For instance, Hans Kelsen said of the U.N. Charter’s ascription of “equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples” that the word “‘peoples’ . . . means probably ‘states,’ since only states have
‘equal rights’ according to general international law . . . so ‘self-determination of peoples’ . . . can mean
only ‘sovereignty of states.’” HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS 52 (1950).
44 See Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, The Normative Role of the General Assembly of the United Nations
and the Declaration of Principles of Friendly Relations, in COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE
ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (VOLUME 137) 419, 562-65 (1974).
45 The citizens in the territory must give their explicit consent to any territorial transfer, ideally
through a referendum. See ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL
REAPPRAISAL 132-33, 189-90 (1995); See Higgins, supra note 42, at 119-20 (discussing independent
territories).
46 G.A. Res. 217A (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 21 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter
UDHR]; ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 25; Higgins, supra note 42, at 120-21 (Higgins explains the link in
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determination, including their right freely to dispose of natural resources, are
exercised independently of the state, as citizens exercise their individual
political rights.47
In sum, as Antonio Cassese says about the Covenants, “[t]o hold that
peoples as such are not entitled to any legal claim proper means to gloss over
the significance of the step taken in 1966 by member states of the UN when
adopting Article 1—a step designed to upgrade peoples to the status of coactors in the world community, of participants in at least some international
dealings.”48
II. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND NATURAL RESOURCES: FROM THEORY TO
PRACTICE
From the 1970s onward, the state’s permanent sovereignty over natural
resources was confirmed in many resolutions and instruments.49
Simultaneously, natural resource rights were increasingly affirmed for two
distinct kinds of peoples: for indigenous peoples (discussed in this part) and
for all citizens of an independent state (discussed in parts III and IV).
It is well established that “peoples” in international law may refer to a
portion of a population and especially to marginalized communities such as
indigenous peoples or minority groups that have a particular interest in, or
proximity to, specific territory or natural resources.50 Indeed, much of the
international jurisprudence and literature on the right to freely dispose of
natural resources focuses on indigenous peoples’ rights to natural
resources.51
This is likely because most of the legal disputes in which indigenous
peoples have been involved have had some connection to resource

this way, “There is a close relationship between Article 1 and 25 of the ICCPR.” While Article 1
guarantees people’s free choice of political status and free pursuit of their economic, and cultural
development, Article 25 “concerns the detail of how free choice is to be provided (periodic elections on
the basis of universal suffrage, etc.).”)
47 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation 21, The Right
to Self-Determination, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/51/18, Annex. VIII (Mar. 8, 1996). As the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination has stated, these individual rights are linked to the people’s rights
to internal self-determination.
48 CASSESE, supra note 45, at 144.
49 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v. Uganda) 2005 I.C.J. 168, 251 (Dec. 19) (in 2005, the I.C.J. determined that permanent
sovereignty over natural resources is customary international law).
50 See Gilbert, supra note 18, at 26.
51 See James Anaya & Robert Williams, The Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights over Lands
and Natural Resources Under the Inter-American Human Rights System, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 33,
79 (2001).
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extraction.52 Over the last three decades, indigenous peoples have
successfully pushed for the recognition of their rights to land and natural
resources as part of their human rights. This has resulted in the emergence
of a significant body of jurisprudence on indigenous peoples’ natural
resource rights.53
Three major legal developments have supported this evolution, which
this part will address in turn. The first concerns a reinterpretation of the right
to self-determination and the meaning of sovereignty over natural resources.
The second is the emergence of rights to participation and consent with
regard to “developmental” resource projects located on indigenous
territories. The third is a recognition of a fundamental link between natural
resources and cultural rights. As argued below, by deploying human rights
norms regarding self-determination, development, and cultural rights,
indigenous peoples have achieved substantially heightened recognition of
their rights over natural resources.
A. The Revival of the Right to Self-determination over Natural Resources
The right to self-determination has been one of the anchors of the
decades-long indigenous movement, which has partly aimed at redressing
the wrongs of colonization.54 More significantly, indigenous rights advocates
have established new interpretations of the meaning of self-determination
under international law.55
Historically, the right to self-determination has been associated with a
right to national political independence and statehood.56 Yet the Western
legal conception of statehood is foreign to most indigenous communities,
who organized their land and territories outside the Westphalian state system

52 See PATRICIA I. VASQUEZ, OIL SPARKS IN THE AMAZON: LOCAL CONFLICTS, INDIGENOUS
POPULATIONS, AND NATURAL RESOURCES (2014); IN THE WAY OF DEVELOPMENT: INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES, LIFE PROJECTS, AND GLOBALIZATION (Mario Blaser, Harvey A. Feit, & Glenn McRae eds.,
2004).
53 See Anaya & Williams, supra note 51, at 33; see also JÉRÉMIE GILBERT, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’
LAND RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM VICTIMS TO ACTORS (2016).
54 See ALEXANDRA XANTHAKI, INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND UNITED NATIONS STANDARDS: SELFDETERMINATION, CULTURE, AND LAND (2007); JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004); KAREN KNOP, DIVERSITY AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2002); MAIVAN LAM, AT THE END OF THE STATE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND SELFDETERMINATION (2000).
55 See Jeff Corntassel, Toward Sustainable Self-Determination: Rethinking the Contemporary
Indigenous Rights Discourse, 33 ALTERNATIVES 105 (2008).
56 See Martti Koskenniemi, National Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and
Practice 43 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 241, 249 (1994); Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A
Territorial Interpretation, 16 YALE J. INT’L L. 177 (1991); CASSESE, supra note 45, at 71-74.
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before the colonial era.57 Indigenous peoples have successfully argued that
self-determination is not only or even mostly about statehood, but about their
fundamental rights over their lands and natural resources.58
The adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in 2007 is a good illustration of this shift.
The battle over the right to self-determination was at the heart of the twentytwo years of negotiations that led to adoption of the Declaration.59 Most
states’ representatives resisted the recognition of an indigenous right to selfdetermination, which they feared meant a right to secession and the creation
of independent states. Yet the indigenous advocates instead emphasized an
interpretation of self-determination that centered on rights to govern their
own land and natural resources. As the negotiations revealed, the
overwhelming majority of indigenous peoples do not want to secede, but
rather seek the protection of their traditional territories from further
encroachment and the right to determine how natural resources will be
used.60
The negotiations over the drafting of the UNDRIP resulted in a
compromise. Article 3 states that, “Indigenous peoples have the right to selfdetermination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political
57

See PAUL KEAL, EUROPEAN CONQUEST AND THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (2003);
ROBERT J. MILLER ET AL., DISCOVERING INDIGENOUS LANDS: THE DOCTRINE OF DISCOVERY IN THE
ENGLISH COLONIES (2012).
58 See INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: SELF-DETERMINATION, KNOWLEDGE, INDIGENEITY (Henry Minde ed.,
2008); Jeff Corntassel & Cheryl Bryce, Practicing Sustainable Self-Determination: Indigenous
Approaches to Cultural Restoration and Revitalization, 18 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 151 (2011); Ted
Moses, Self-Determination and the Survival of Indigenous Peoples, in OPERATIONALIZING THE RIGHT OF
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION 155, 162 (Pekka Aikio & Martin Scheinin eds., 2001)
(as Ted Moses, the former Grand Chief of the Grand Council of the Crees, has stated: “Self-determination
may make some people think of the right to vote, or the right to belong to political parties or the right to
self-government. . . . But when I think of self-determination I think also of hunting, fishing, and trapping.
I think of the land, of the water, the trees, and the animals.”).
59 See Timo Koivurova, From High Hopes to Disillusionment: Indigenous Peoples’ Struggle to
(re)Gain Their Right to Self-Determination 15 INT’L J. MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 1 (2008); Isabelle
Schulte-Tenckhoff, Treaties, Peoplehood and Self-Determination: Understanding the Language of
Indigenous Rights, in INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF THE UN DECLARATION 64 (Elvira Pulitano ed.,
2012).
60 See MAIVȂN CLECH LȂM, AT THE EDGE OF THE STATE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND SELFDETERMINATION (2000); Erica-Irene A. Daes (Chairperson of the Working Group on Indigenous
Populations), Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples—Explanatory Note Concerning the Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/26/Add.1, ¶ 26, (July 19,
1993); James Anaya, A Contemporary Definition of the International Norm of Self-Determination, 31
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 143 (1993) (as James Anaya, the former UN special rapporteur
on the rights of indigenous peoples, noted “[F]ull self-determination, [which] necessarily means a right
to choose independent statehood, ultimately rests on a narrow state-centered vision of humanity and the
world . . . [that] is blind to the contemporary realities of . . . a world in which the formal boundaries of
statehood do not altogether determine the ordering of communities and authority.”).
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status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”
Article 4 adds that “Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to selfdetermination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters
relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for
financing their autonomous functions.” However, Article 46 denies that the
Declaration should be “construed as authorizing or encouraging any action
which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity
or political unity of sovereign and independent states.”
The Declaration marks a significant evolution in the international law
of self-determination. It represents one of the first instruments to recognize
the right of self-determination for peoples other than peoples territorially
organized as states and colonies,61 and it moves the law from a post-colonial
understanding of self-determination focused on political independence to a
contemporary interpretation of self-determination concerning rights over
natural resources. This does not mean that states have lost their ultimate
sovereignty over natural resources, but that in exercising their sovereignty
they must respect the rights of indigenous peoples over the natural resources
located on their ancestral territories. This is what is referred to as the new
“relational approach to self-determination.”62
This new interpretation of self-determination as a “relational” principle
is supported by the progressive jurisprudence of several international human
rights bodies, which drew out its implications for common Article 1 of the
human rights Covenants.
Until the 1990s, little human rights jurisprudence concerned the
implementation of Article 1 of the Covenants. Indeed, until it was used by
indigenous peoples, the HRC did not include Article 1 as a ground for
individual complaints.63 Several indigenous complaints then led the HRC to
adopt a new approach to self-determination, within which it has referred
several times to Article 1(2) of the Covenant in relation to indigenous
peoples.64 For example, in its Concluding Observations on Canada in 1999,
the HRC emphasized that “the right to self-determination requires, inter alia,
61 See Dorothée Cambou, The UNDRIP and the Legal Significance of the Right of Indigenous
Peoples to Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach with a Multidimensional Perspective, 23 INT’L
J. HUM. RTS. 34, 35 (2019).
62 Benedict Kingsbury, Reconstructing Self-Determination: A Relational Approach, in Aikio &
Scheinin eds., supra note 58, at 19, 22.
63 See HRC, Chief Ominayak and Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, UN Doc. CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984
(Mar. 26, 1990); HRC, Kitok v. Sweden, UN Doc. CCPR/C/33/D/197/1985 (July 27, 1988); HRC, I.
Länsman et al. v. Finland, UN Doc. CCPR/C/57/1 (June 11, 1992); HRC, J. Länsman et al. v. Finland,
UN Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/671/1995 (Aug. 28, 1995).
64 See, e.g., HRC, Apirana Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand, UN Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993 (Oct.
27, 2000). For analysis, see Martin Scheinin, The Right to Self-Determination Under the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, in Aikio & Scheinin eds., supra note 58, at 179.
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that all peoples must be able to freely dispose of their natural resources and
that they may not be deprived of their own means of subsistence (art. 1, para.
2).”65 In the same year, the Committee invited Norway to report “on the Sami
peoples’ right to self-determination under Article 1 of the Covenant,
including paragraph 2 of that article.”66 The HRC also referred to indigenous
peoples’ right to self-determination in its Concluding Observations on
Mexico, Panama, Australia, Denmark, and Sweden.67
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)
has adopted a similar approach, referring to Article 1 of its Covenant in
several of its Concluding Observations.68 For instance, in its Concluding
Observations regarding Paraguay, the CESCR expressed its concerns “about
the fact that the State party has not yet legally recognized the right of
indigenous peoples to dispose freely of their natural wealth and resources or
put in place an effective mechanism to enable them to claim their ancestral
lands (art. 1).”69 Thus, both the HRC and CESCR now interpret selfdetermination as requiring that indigenous peoples play a role in decisionmaking over the management of natural resources on their ancestral
territories.
The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(CERD) has also supported this connection between self-determination and
natural resources. In its General Recommendation XXI on the right to selfdetermination, CERD pointed out that the right to self-determination implies
an obligation for states to act to preserve the culture of ethnic groups within
their territory. The Committee found that this obligation arises as a
consequence of the right of self-determination, and stated that this right gives
persons belonging to ethnic groups “the right to engage in such activities
which are particularly relevant to the preservation of the identity of such

65

HRC, Concluding Observations: Canada, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.105, ¶ 8 (Apr. 7, 1999).
HRC, Concluding Observations: Norway, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.112, ¶ 17 (Oct. 26, 1999).
67 See HRC, Concluding Observations: Mexico, UN Doc. CCPR/C/MEX/CO/5 (Mar. 26, 2010);
HRC, Concluding Observations: Panama, UN Doc. CCPR/C/PAN/CO/3 (Apr. 4, 2008); HRC,
Concluding Observations: Australia, UN Doc. CCPR/C/AUS/CO/5 (Apr. 2, 2009); HRC, Concluding
Observations: Denmark, UN Doc. CCPR/C/DNK/CO/5 (Oct. 13, 2008); HRC, Concluding
Observations: Sweden, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/74/SWE (Apr. 24, 2002).
68 See CESCR, Concluding Observations: Argentina, UN Doc. E/C.12/ARG/CO/3 (Dec. 14, 2011);
CESCR, Concluding Observations: Finland, UN Doc. E/C.12/FIN/CO/6 (Dec. 17, 2014); CESCR,
Concluding Observations: Guatemala, UN Doc. E/C.12/GTM/CO/3 (Dec. 9, 2014); CESCR, Concluding
Observations: Cambodia, UN Doc. E/C.12/KHM/CO/1 (June 12, 2009).
69 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Paraguay, ¶ 6, UN Doc. E/C.12/PRY/CO/4 (Mar. 20, 2015).
66
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persons or groups.”70 This right encompasses a right of indigenous peoples
to participate in decisions affecting their territories.71
This approach to self-determination has been echoed in the
jurisprudence of the regional human rights institutions. The Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) has invoked Article 1 of the ICCPR and
ICESCR to interpret the right of indigenous peoples over their ancestral
natural resources. For example, in the case of the Saramaka People, the
IACtHR explained that “property rights must be interpreted so as not to
restrict their right to self-determination, by virtue of which indigenous
peoples may ‘freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’
and may ‘freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources’.”72 A similar
approach was adopted in the case of the Kaliña and Lokono peoples against
Suriname.73 The Court stated: “[T]he right to property protected by Article
21 of the American Convention, and interpreted in light of the rights
recognized in Article 1 common to the two Covenants, and Article 27 of the
ICCPR which cannot be restricted when interpreting the American
Convention in this case, confer on the members of the Kaliña and Lokono
peoples the right to the enjoyment of their property in keeping with their
community-based tradition.”74
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has also
highlighted the connection between the indigenous right to selfdetermination and control of natural resources. In its Endorois decision
concerning Kenya, the Commission found that the non-respect of the right
to land of the Endorois community violated Article 21 of the African Charter
on Human and People’s Rights, which states that “[a]ll peoples shall freely
dispose of their wealth and natural resources.”75 In finding a violation of
Article 21, the Commission acknowledged that the right to freely dispose of
70 CERD, General Recommendation XXI (Forty-eighth session) on Self-Determination, ¶ 5, UN
Doc. A/51/18, annex VIII (Mar. 8, 1996).
71 See CERD, General Recommendation XXIII (Fifty-first session) on Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
UN Doc. A/52/18, annex V (Sept. 26, 1997) (calling upon state parties to ensure indigenous peoples
effective participation, but making no mention of self-determination per se).
72 Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 93 (Nov. 28, 2007).
73 Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v. Suriname, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 309 (Nov. 25, 2015).
74 Id. at ¶¶ 124, 126. Interestingly, the Court has also included an examination of Article 23 of the
American Convention relating to the right to participate in government.
75 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on
Behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya [Endorois Case], Communication 276/2003, African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.], ¶ 268 (Feb. 4, 2010),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/2010_africa_commission_ruling_0.pdf ; Org. of
African Unity [OAU], African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights [African Charter] art. 21 ¶ 1,
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5 21, I.L.M. 58 (1982) (June 27, 1981).
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natural resources is of crucial importance to indigenous peoples and their
way of life.76 This was later confirmed in the African Court’s decision
regarding the Ogiek community, in which the Court ruled that the
government of Kenya had violated Article 21 of the Charter by restricting
access to territories and natural resources that were essential to guarantee the
Ogiek’s access to food.77
Overall, a survey of the human rights treaty monitoring bodies and the
regional human rights institutions demonstrates a substantive international
jurisprudence affirming the self-determination rights of indigenous peoples
over natural resources located on their ancestral territories.
B. “Self-determined Development” and the Right to Free, Prior, and
Informed Consent
The principle of self-determined development arose as a reaction to
what indigenous communities across the world have called “imposed
development” and “development aggression.”78 This refers to the imposition
of top-down economic development policies, usually involving major
projects to exploit natural resources on indigenous territory. Indigenous
peoples have often become victims of such policies, with the “development”
projects leading to forced displacement, land dispossession, and
environmental degradation.79 In response, indigenous peoples have called for
the recognition of a right to “self-determined development,” a hybrid of the
right to self-determination and the right to development.80
This call for self-determined development was answered in 1986 in the
UN Declaration on the Right to Development (UNDRTD).81 Its Preamble
recalls “the right of peoples to exercise . . . full and complete sovereignty
over all their natural wealth and resources,” and Article 1(2) states that “the
human right to development also implies the full realization of the right of
peoples to self-determination, which includes, subject to the relevant
provisions of both International Covenants on Human Rights, the exercise of
76 Endorois Case, supra note 75; see also, Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center
for Economic, and Social Rights v. Nigeria [SERAC v. Nigeria], Communication 155/96, Afr. Comm’n
H.P.R., (May 27, 2002), https://www.achpr.org/public/Document/file/English/achpr30_155_96_eng.pdf
(showing the correlation between cultural rights and access to natural resources).
77 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Republic of Kenya [Ogiek Case], App.
No. 006/2012, African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights [Afr. Ct. H.P.R.], ¶ 201 (May 26, 2017).
78 See Cathal Doyle & Jérémie Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples and Globalization: From “Development
Aggression” to “Self-Determined Development”, 8 EUR. Y.B. OF MINORITY ISSUES 219, 220, 223 (2009).
79 See IN THE WAY OF DEVELOPMENT, supra note 52.
80 See INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ INT’L CTR. FOR POL’Y RSCH. & EDUC. [TEBTEBBA], TOWARDS AN
ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ SELF-DETERMINED DEVELOPMENT
(Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, Leah Enkiwe-Abayao, & Raymond de Chavez eds., 2010).
81 G.A. Res. 41/128, Declaration on the Right to Development, at Pmbl. (Dec. 1986).
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their inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and
resources.”
Indigenous peoples have contributed positively to specifying concrete
and justiciable rights to development.82 These rights retained the Covenants’
idea of a people’s right to freely dispose of its natural resources, specified as
a right of peoples to participate in decisions which impact their ancestral
territories.
The Endorois case is a good illustration of this.83 The case concerned
the forced removal of an indigenous community in the name of development
(tourism and mining), which resulted in the community losing access to
essential natural resources (water and pastoral lands). Linking selfdetermination with development, the community highlighted that they had
“suffered a loss of well-being through the limitations on their choice and
capacities, including effective and meaningful participation in projects that
will affect them.”84 The African Commission ruled that regarding “any
development or investment projects that would have a major impact within
the Endorois territory, the state has a duty not only to consult with the
community, but also to obtain their free, prior, and informed consent,
according to their customs and traditions.”85
This is one of the first international human rights cases to affirm
communities’ right to free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC).86 The
establishment of a right to FPIC is one of the most significant developments
in the human rights-based approach to natural resources management.87 It
recognizes that indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop
priorities for the use of their lands or territories and other resources. This
requirement has been endorsed by international human rights treaty
monitoring bodies. For example, in its 1999 Annual Report on Canada, the
HRC links aboriginal self-government with the right freely to dispose of
natural resources and urges the government to address issues of land and
resource allocation.88 Likewise, in its 2014 review of the United States, the
HRC urged the government to “ensure that consultations are held with the
82 See Jérémie Gilbert & Corinne Lennox, Towards New Development Paradigms: The United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as a Tool to Support Self-Determined
Development, 23 INT. J. HUM. RTS. 104 (2019).
83
Endorois Case, supra note 75 at ¶ 268.
84 Id. at ¶ 129.
85 Id. at ¶ 291.
86 For analysis, see Jérémie Gilbert, Litigating Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in Africa: Potentials,
Challenges, and Limitations, 66 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 657 (2017).
87 See CATHAL DOYLE, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, TITLE TO TERRITORY, RIGHTS AND RESOURCES: THE
TRANSFORMATIVE ROLE OF FREE, PRIOR, AND INFORMED CONSENT (2014).
88 HRC, Concluding Observations: Canada, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.105, ¶ 8 (Apr. 7, 1999).
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indigenous communities that might be adversely affected by the state party’s
development projects and exploitation of natural resources with a view to
obtaining their free, prior and informed consent for proposed project
activities.”89 In a similar fashion, the CESCR committee has urged Colombia
to seek the consent of the indigenous peoples concerned by the
implementation of timber, soil, and sub-soil mining projects affecting them.90
The Inter-American Commission, in a case concerning a Mayan
community in Belize, recognized that the authorities had violated the rights
of the community to property by allowing the exploitation of timber and oil
on their ancestral lands without the community’s full informed consent.91
The Commission highlighted that such consent requires “at a minimum, that
all of the members of the community are fully and accurately informed of
the nature and consequences of the process and provided with an effective
opportunity to participate individually or as collectives.”92 The Commission
held that the obligation to obtain indigenous peoples’ “consent applies to all
state decisions, including the granting of natural resource exploitation
concessions, that may have an impact upon indigenous lands and
communities.”93
As these examples illustrate, since the adoption of the UNDRIP in 2007,
a significant body of decisions and recommendations from international
human rights bodies have emphasized that development projects on
indigenous territories need the free, prior and informed consent of the
communities involved.94 The right to FPIC is a direct application of the right
to self-determination over natural resources, requiring that indigenous
peoples be able to give or withhold consent to development projects that
would affect the natural resources of their ancestral lands.

89

HRC, Concluding Observations: United States, UN Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/4, ¶ 25 (Aug. 23,

2014).
90 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Colombia, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.74, ¶¶ 12, 33 (Nov. 30,
2001); see also Concluding Observations: Brazil, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.87, (May 23, 2003). The CERD
has also referenced indigenous peoples’ right to consent to decisions directly affecting them in many of
its Concluding Observations. For a compilation of these recommendations, see Legal Companion to the
UN-REDD Programme - Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC): International Law
and Jurisprudence Affirming the Requirement of FPIC, UN-REDD PROGRAMME, Jan. 2013.
91 Maya Indigenous Community of the Toledo District v. Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-Am. Comm’n.
H.R., Report No. 40/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122 doc. 5, rev. 1, ¶ 117 (2004).
92 Id. at ¶ 142.
93 Id.
94 See Mauro Barelli, Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the Aftermath of the UN Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Developments and Challenges Ahead, 16 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 1 (2012);
Tara Ward, The Right to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent: Indigenous Peoples’ Participation Rights
within International Law, 10 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 54 (2011).
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C. Cultural Rights and Natural Resources
Cultural rights are an important element of human rights law, embedded
in several international and regional human rights treaties.95 Cultural rights
are the third area of law used by indigenous peoples to press for recognition
of their rights over natural resources. Human rights law recognizes that the
protection of traditional practices of using natural resources can be essential
to ensuring the cultural survival of indigenous peoples.
An important legal norm supporting the connection between natural
resources and indigenous cultural rights has been article 27 of the ICCPR,
which reads: “In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the
right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their
own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own
language.” This article has been interpreted to protect indigenous rights over
natural resources. The connection between cultural rights and natural
resources has been at the heart of several Concluding Observations and
decisions in individual communications of the Committee.96 The HRC heard
several complaints by indigenous peoples in the 1990s, and its decisions in
cases such as Ominayak v Canada,97 Lansman v Finland,98 and Lovelace v
Canada99 have become key elements of international jurisprudence.100 All of
the Committee’s pronouncements emphasize that resource-related activities
that form an essential element of indigenous peoples’ culture should be
protected under article 27 of the ICCPR.
The Inter-American system of human rights has also recognized the
significant connection between cultural rights and natural resources for
indigenous peoples. In several of its cases on indigenous peoples’ rights, the
IACtHR has highlighted how traditional understandings of natural resources
95

UDHR, supra note 46, at art. 27; ICESCR, supra note 19, at art. 15; African Charter, supra note
75, at art. 17; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights [IACHR], American Declaration of the
Rights
and
Duties
of
Man,
art.
13,
May
2,
1948,
available
at
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3710.html. For analysis, see ELSA STAMATOPOULOU, CULTURAL
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ARTICLE 27 OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
BEYOND (2007); THE CULTURAL DIMENSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Ana Vrdoljak ed., 2013).
96 See FOREST PEOPLES PROGRAMME, A COMPILATION OF UN TREATY BODY JURISPRUDENCE,
SPECIAL PROCEDURES OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, AND THE ADVICE OF THE EXPERT MECHANISM
ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, Vol. V, at III (Fergus MacKay ed., 2013).
97 HRC, Chief Ominayak and Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, UN Doc. CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984
(Mar. 26, 1990).
98 HRC, J. Länsman et al. v. Finland, UN Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (Nov. 8, 1994).
99 HRC, Sandra Lovelace v. Canada, UN Doc. A/36/40 (July 30, 1981).
100 For analysis, see Martin Scheinin, The Right to Enjoy a Distinct Culture: Indigenous and
Competing Uses of Land, in THE JURISPRUDENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: A COMPARATIVE
INTERPRETIVE APPROACH (Theodore S. Orlin et al. eds., 2000), 163-64.
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form an essential element of indigenous peoples’ right to cultural identity. In
the Saramaka case, for instance, the Court highlighted that, for indigenous
peoples, “the right to use and enjoy their territory would be meaningless in
the context of indigenous and tribal communities if said right were not
connected to the natural resources that lie on and within the land.”101 A
similar approach has been adopted by the African Commission and Court.102
In the Court’s ruling concerning the Ogiek community of Kenya, for
example, it stated that, “in the context of traditional societies, where formal
religious institutions often do not exist, the practice and profession of
religion are usually inextricably linked with land and the environment. In
indigenous societies in particular, the freedom to worship and to engage in
religious ceremonies depends on access to land and the natural
environment.”103
At least part of the success of indigenous peoples in asserting their right
to dispose of natural resources is attributable to their unique and wellrecognized cultural rights. Both the Inter-American Court and the African
Commission “draw a clear link between the recognition of indigenous
peoples’ substantive rights to own, use, occupy, control, and develop their
traditional land and resources and the cultural survival of indigenous
communities.”104 The significance placed on the survival of a group’s
traditions and customs is clear. Indeed, the Inter-American Court explicitly
states that when determining what limits to the right are permissible, a
“crucial factor to be considered is whether the restriction amounts to a denial
of their traditions and customs in a way that endangers the very survival of
the group and of its members.”105 Since the exploitation of land and resources
are recognized as potentially jeopardizing the cultural survival of indigenous
groups, courts and UN treaty bodies have been particularly vigilant in
recognizing indigenous rights to natural resources.
In sum, from the 1980s onward, advocates for indigenous peoples
invigorated the links between international human rights law and peoples’
rights over natural resources. Indigenous peoples challenged the orthodox
state-centered interpretations of sovereignty and self-determination over
101 Saramaka People v. Suriname, supra note 72, ¶ 122; see also Case of the Kichwa Indigenous
People of Sarayaku, Merits and Reparation, Judgement, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 220 (June
27, 2012); Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgement, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125 ¶ 135 (June 17, 2005).
102 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Resolution on the Protection of Sacred
Natural Sites and Territories, ACHPR /Res. 372 (LX) (May 22, 2017) (the Commission makes a direct
connection between human rights and state obligations to protect and respect natural sacred sites).
103 Ogiek Case, supra note 77, at ¶ 164; see also Endorois Case, supra note 75.
104 Miranda, supra note 30, at 820.
105 Saramaka People v. Suriname, supra note 72, at ¶ 128.
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natural resources, adding a human rights-based dimension which insists on
the resource rights of peoples. In doing so, they moved the legal discussion
from a theoretical debate about sovereignty over natural resources to a more
practical emphasis on consent and cultural attachment.
III. THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS OVER NATURAL RESOURCES
International law recognizes three types of “peoples” as having rights
over natural resources: peoples under colonial occupation (examined in Part
I), indigenous peoples (examined in Part II), and all of the citizens of an
independent state (examined here). Respect for the rights of citizens of
independent states are of the greatest importance for peace and good
governance in resource-rich states and regions. These rights are sometimes
misunderstood, so in this part we take up three preliminary points before
discussing the historical specification of the content of the rights in Part IV.
First, we discuss the meaning of the term “people” in international law.
Second, we expand on how international law divides resource rights between
citizens and states. Third, we show how citizens’ rights over resources are
compatible with a wide variety of political and economic systems and that
citizens’ rights in no way require “resource nationalism.”
A. “People” as All Citizens of a State
Understanding the meaning of the term “people” is essential for correct
interpretation of the many international instruments in which it occurs.106 As
we have seen, “people” can often refer to indigenous and other national subgroups, yet the term does not refer exclusively to such groups.107
Authoritative bodies, such as the CESCR, often refer to “people” in the sense
of “all citizens of a state.”108 Indeed, the CESCR has helped to establish this
as a focal sense of “people” by “insisting that states are procedurally
accountable to the ‘general public,’ as the relevant ‘people,’ in their dealings
with the state’s natural resources.”109
For example, in its 1997 Concluding Observations for Azerbaijan, the
CESCR “calls attention to [A]rticle 1 on the right of self-determination,”
stresses that the state must manage the privatization of the country’s oil
106

BEN SAUL, DAVID KINLEY, & JACQUELINE MOWBRAY, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: COMMENTARY, CASES, AND MATERIALS 25–27 (2014).
107 Neither the ICESCR nor the ICCPR specifically mention “indigenous” peoples, and in no case or
commentary have rights over natural resources been interpreted as applying only to indigenous peoples
or other subgroups.
108 See Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of the Congo) [Guinea
v. DRC], Judgement, 2010 I.C.J. 639, ¶ 66 (Nov. 30) (the opinions of the treaty bodies are significant, as
these opinions are recognized as having substantial weight by the International Court of Justice).
109 Saul, Kinley, & Mowbray, supra note 106, at 52.
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resources in a way that is “sufficiently transparent to ensure fairness and
accountability,” and regrets that it is not able to assess the extent that “the
general public is able to participate” in this privatization.110 Similarly, in its
2009 Concluding Observations on the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC), the CESCR uses the “all citizens” sense of “people” instead of
limiting Article 1(2) to a specific subgroup or community.111 Concerned with
the manner in which the DRC’s extensive mineral resources are being
exploited, the CESCR calls on the DRC government to “review without
delay the mining contracts in a transparent and participatory way” and to
“repeal all contracts which are detrimental to the Congolese people.”112
Finally, in respect to Article 1(2), in its 2009 Concluding Observations on
Cambodia, the CESCR focuses on the people of Cambodia as a whole when
it strongly recommends that the “granting of economic concessions take into
account the need for sustainable development and for all Cambodians to
share in the benefits of progress.” 113 The CESCR again ascribes the right to
all of the citizens of the state.
The Human Rights Committee has been less engaged than the CESCR
in clarifying common Article 1(2) of the Covenants.114 It has, however,
addressed the right freely to dispose of natural resources and demonstrated
its preference for a wide interpretation of the term “people.”115 Moreover, in
its 1984 comment on the right to self-determination of peoples, the HRC
states that Article 1 of the ICCPR affirms the “inalienable” right of all
peoples freely to “determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development.”116 Article 1(2) “affirms a
110 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Azerbaijan, E/C.12/1/Add.20, ¶ 16 (Dec. 22, 1997). The
CESCR further states that the “ability of people to defend their own economic, social and cultural rights
depends significantly on the availability of public information . . . it is important that the privatization
process should be conducted in an open and transparent manner and that the conditions under which oil
concessions are granted should always be made public.” Id. ¶ 29. In the case of Azerbaijan, there was no
subset of the population within the country that was specifically affected by the oil concessions; the
Committee uses “people” to refer to the citizenry as a whole.
111 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Democratic Republic of Congo, E/C.12/COD/CO/4, ¶ 13
(Dec. 16, 2009).
112 Id. Importantly, the CESCR purposely frames its call to action in broad terms (“the Congolese
people”) instead of focusing on the specific community that would be most affected by the exploitation
of natural resources (those Congolese living in Katanga). This suggests that while local populations may
have special interests in their region’s natural resources, the right of Article 1(2) is held in the first instance
by all of the citizens of the state.
113 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Cambodia, E/C.12/KHM/CO/1, ¶ 15 (June 12, 2009).
114 SARAH JOSEPH & MELISSA CASTAN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY, 162 (3d ed. 2013).
115 For example, when it criticized Azerbaijan’s narrow view of self-determination as only applying
to colonized peoples. HRC, Concluding Observations: Azerbaijan, supra note 110, ¶ 6.
116 HRC, General Comment No 12: Article 1 (Right to Self-Determination), 21st Sess., ¶ 2 (Mar. 13,
1984).
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particular aspect of the economic content of the right of self-determination,”
namely the right of peoples to freely dispose of their natural wealth and
resources.117 The broad right of self-determination of peoples is of particular
importance, the HRC says, “because its realization is an essential condition
for the effective guarantee and observance of individual human rights and
for the promotion and strengthening of those rights.”118 As individual human
rights are not limited to subgroups or populations under colonial control, it
is reasonable to presume that the HRC interprets Article 1(2) as applying to
the whole citizenry of independent states.
This interpretation is further supported by the statement of the CERD
on the right to self-determination of peoples,119 and in the work of the African
human rights institutions.120 For example, in its communication on Front for
the Liberation of the State of Cabinda v. Republic of Angola, the Commission
is explicit that the term “peoples” in the Article of the African Charter
dealing with natural resources can mean either the entire people of a state or
a people within the state.121

117

Id.
Id. ¶ 1.
119 “The right to self-determination of peoples has an internal aspect, that is to say, the rights of all
peoples to pursue freely their economic, social, and cultural development without outside interference. In
that respect there exists a link with the right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of public affairs
at any level . . . Governments are to represent the whole population without distinction as to race, colour,
descent or national or ethnic origin.” CERD, General Recommendation XXI, supra note 70, ¶ 4 (emphasis
added). See G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 23, at 2.
120 In its discussion of natural resource rights in the African Charter, the African Commission affirms
that “[a]lthough natural resources under Article 21 are often localized in a particular region, this does not
mean that entitlement to the benefits from the sustainable and human rights compliant use of such natural
resources is limited to affected people living on or near such territory – the peoples of the State as a whole
are also entitled to benefit from such resources.” ACHPR, supra note 17, ¶ 23. See also the Commission’s
explicit definitions of “people” in ¶ 14, which includes both “the entire population of a State’” and “subnational groups.” Id. ¶ 14. The Commission further demonstrates its support for the wide interpretation
of the term “people” by calling on state parties to reaffirm that the “state has the main responsibility for
ensuring natural resources stewardship with, and for the interest of, the population” and must ensure
“participation, including the free, prior and informed consent of communities, in decision making related
to natural resource governance.” AFR. COMM’N, Resolution on a Human Rights-based Approach to
Natural Resource Governance, Res. 224, 51st Sess., ¶ 15 (2012) (emphasis added). By choosing to use
both the general term “population” and the more specific term “communities” in reference to the right to
freely dispose of natural resources, the Commission favors a broad interpretation over a narrow one that
would limit “people” only to subsets of the population.
121 Front for the Liberation of the State of Cabinda v. Republic of Angola, Communication 328/06,
AFR. COMM’N H.P.R., [Angola], ¶ 130 (Nov. 5, 2013). Furthermore, the Commission has prioritized
membership in national peoples over membership in subnational peoples in cases where the two have
conflicted. When presented with a plea to recognize the independence of the Katangese people from
Zaire, the Commission demurred partly because no evidence had been submitted that the human right of
individuals in Katanga to participate in government was being denied. As individuals in Katanga could
participate in the government of Zaire, their human right to participate was fulfilled by their rights as
118
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It is also the opinion of scholars of international law that the right of
peoples to freely dispose of natural wealth and resources did not originally
apply to identity-based communities within the territorial boundaries of a
state.122 Lillian Miranda argues that common Article 1(2) of the Covenants
is best understood as mediating the relationship between the state and the
national polity, and that it creates obligations for the government of a state
to its people as a whole.123 This is consistent with other rights protected by
the Covenants, all of which are rights exercised by citizens against their state.
Thus, the preponderance of evidence supports an interpretation of
international legal texts that often understands a “people” as designating all
of the citizens of an independent state.
B. The “Internal-External” Interpretation of Peoples’ and States’
Resource Rights
International law ascribes to peoples internal rights over resources, to
be claimed against the state, and ascribes to states external rights over
resources, to be claimed against other states. Peoples’ rights over resources
are thus an aspect of internal self-determination, while states’ rights over
resources are an aspect of external self-determination.
Today, the “internal-external” interpretation of peoples’ and states’
rights to natural resources is endorsed by many authoritative sources, as
illustrated in the African context. The African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights uses similar language to describe the rights of “peoples” and
“states” over natural resources: Article 21(1) asserts the right of peoples to
freely dispose of natural resources while Article 21(4) recognizes the rights
of states to freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources.124
To resolve this tension, the African Commission has explained that the
people’s right is an internal one against its state, while the state’s right is an
external one against other states. For the external right, the African
Commission has said in its Guidelines for National Periodic Reports that
Article 21 ensures that the material wealth of states is not exploited by aliens
for no or little benefit to the African countries.125 Similarly, in its Angola
communication, the Commission states that “Article 21 of the Charter . . .
citizens within the national people. Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire, Communication 75/92, AFR.
COMM’N H.P.R. ¶ 6 (Oct. 1995).
122 See, e.g., Karen Engle, On Fragile Architecture: The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples in the Context of Human Rights, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 141, 154 (2011); Siegfried Wiessner, The
Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Achievements and Continuing Challenges, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L.
121, 133 (2011).
123 Miranda, supra note 30, at 800.
124 African Charter, supra note 75.
125 ACHPR, supra note 17, at 16.

55

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

triggers an obligation on the part of the state parties to protect their citizens
from exploitation by external economic powers.”126
At the same time, the Commission has also confirmed that Article 21
of the Charter carries with it internal rights held by peoples, which place
duties upon their states. In Resolution 224, A Human Rights-Based Approach
to Natural Resource Governance, the Commission asserts that the state has
the main responsibility for ensuring natural resource stewardship with, and
in the interest of, the population.127 The Commission is even more firm in its
2017 guidance on Article 21, which refers to the “the unquestionable and
inalienable right to self-determination” of peoples in Article 20.
First and foremost, the right to freely dispose of wealth and natural
resources is an inviolable right of all peoples, an extension and central
element of the right to self-determination provided for in Article 20 of the
Charter. The right and the entitlements arising from it belong to peoples.
States only have a delegated role entailing the exercise of this right. Article
21 is emphatic that this role of states must be executed in the exclusive
interest of the people. The last provision of Article 21(5) explicitly affirms
that peoples of states party to the African Charter are entitled to “fully benefit
from the advantages derived from their national resources.”128
Legal scholars support the principle that peoples’ rights to their natural
resources correspond to duties owed to them by their state as a trustee.129 In
sum, when international instruments ascribe resource rights to states, these
are most plausibly understood as external rights of a state against other states.
When these instruments ascribe resource rights to peoples, these are most
plausibly understood as internal rights of citizens against their state,
corresponding to state duties toward its citizens.
C. A People’s Resource Rights Do Not Require Resource Nationalism
When discussing the rights of citizens over natural resources, it is worth
bearing in mind that many early debates over these rights took place at the
height of the Cold War.130 One lingering legacy of the ideological battles
126

Angola, supra note 121, ¶ 129.
ACHPR, Resolution on a Human-Rights Based Approach to Natural Resource Governance, Res.
224, at 1 (May 2, 2012).
128 ACHPR, supra note 17, at 10; AFR. COMM’N, Resolution on the Niamey Declaration on Ensuring
the Upholding of the African Charter in the Extractive Industries Sector, ACHPR/Res. 367 (LX), at 1
(2017).
129 See, e.g., Emeka Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty and Peoples’ Ownership of Natural
Resources in International Law, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 33, 65 (2006); Miranda, supra note 30, at
804; Richard Kiwanuka, The Meaning of “People” in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
82 AM. J. INT’L L. 80 (1988).
130 Schrijver, supra note 27, at 6.
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between capitalism and communism is the mistaken idea that any rights
ascribed to “peoples” require some form of continuing collective ownership
and control.
In this context, it is critical that the legal rights of peoples over resources
be understood as permissive in two ways. First, these rights do not require
any specific political-economic system to be institutionalized within a state.
Second, these rights do not require “resource nationalism”: that is, they are
neutral regarding state ownership or control over natural resources. Both of
these points can be demonstrated by surveying how citizens’ rights over
natural resources are declared within national constitutions.
Rights of the people over natural resources are proclaimed in national
constitutions in all world regions.131 Many of these constitutions use
propertarian language (for example, “natural resources belong to the people”
or “are owned by the people”).132 While all of these national constitutions
affirm the right of the people over natural resources, the diversity of these
instruments show that these rights do not require any particular political or
economic model. Both resource privatization to individuals and state
resource management, for example, are compatible with the people’s rights.
This can be seen by comparing three states’ constitutional and statutory
provisions for natural resource ownership. According to the Mexican
constitution, resource privatization is permitted.133 Zambia’s 2005 draft
constitution, on the other hand, sets itself against privatization.134 Papua New
Guinea’s Land Act designates the great bulk of the country’s land (currently
131 For example, in the constitutions of Bolivia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Indonesia, Iraq, Kiribati,
Liberia, Moldova, Mongolia, Niger, Senegal, Solomon Islands, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine, and Vietnam.
See Constitute Project, https://www.constituteproject.org/search?lang=en&q=natural%20resources
&status=in_force (last visited Feb. 12, 2021) (providing sections concerning “natural resources” in the
respective constitutions for each country).
132 For example: “The natural resources belong to the people.” SENEGAL [CONSTITUTION] 2001 rev.
2016, art. 25-1; “Oil and gas are owned by all the people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates.”
IRAQ [CONSTITUTION] 2005, art. 111; “The land, its mineral wealth, atmosphere, water and other natural
resources within the territory of Ukraine, the natural resources of its continental shelf, and the exclusive
(maritime) economic zone, are objects of the right of property of the Ukrainian people.” UKRAINE
[CONSTITUTION] 1996 with amendments through 2016, art. 13.
133 “The Nation has an original right of property over the land and waters within the boundaries of
the national territory. The Nation has and will have the right to transfer its property’s domain to private
individuals in order to create private property rights.” MEXICO [CONSTITUTION] 1917 with amendments
through 2019, art. 27. Article 27 further specifies: “The Nation owns what follows: all natural resources
at both the continental platform and the islands’ seafloor . . . all the oil and all solid, liquid and gaseous
hydrocarbons.” The Mexican constitution carefully distinguishes “the Nation” (la Nación) from “the
State” (el Estado).
134 “The State shall devise land policies which recognize ultimate ownership of land by the people.”;
“The management and development of Zambia’s natural resources shall not bestow private ownership of
any natural resource.” ZAMBIA [CONSTITUTION of Zambia Act, 2005 (the “Mung’omba Draft”)] 1, art.
10v, 339f.
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97 percent) as “customary land,” “owned by the Indigenous People of Papua
New Guinea.”135
Privatization to individual owners (as in the United States),
management by a national authority (as in Norway and Venezuela),
indigenous rights (as in Papua New Guinea), and mixed systems (as in
Indonesia) are all legal regimes that are compatible with the rights of citizens
over natural resources. The natural resources of a state start out in the
people’s hands at independence—as a United Nations special commission
once put it, the country’s natural resources are a people’s “birthright.”136
After independence, citizens may then “freely dispose” of their resources in
many different ways. Depending on how citizens freely dispose of the
territory’s resources, any number of resource management regimes may
result. “Resource nationalism,” where the state owns or controls the
territory’s key natural resources, is one possibility but is in no way required.
Resource privatization is, as the national laws above show, equally available
as an option. A people’s right to dispose of their resources is a discretionary
right, and so is neutral as to the disposition of resource ownership that will
result from its exercise.
IV. THE CONTENT OF RESOURCE RIGHTS: CITIZENS’ RIGHTS AND STATE
DUTIES
International law recognizes that states enjoy external rights over a
territory’s natural resources insofar as states have permanent sovereignty
which must not be interfered with by other states.137 A state’s sovereign right,
however, is not absolute; it is encumbered by the internal rights of its people
freely to dispose of these same natural resources. This is consonant with the
broader human rights project of ensuring state accountability to citizens
through individual rights that create corresponding state obligations.138 While
states’ rights correspond to duties on other states, human rights correspond
to duties on the state to protect and empower citizens.
The right of peoples to their natural resources has been recognized and
elaborated by a variety of different sources acknowledged as persuasive in

135

See Palais Wilson (Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms of Indigenous People), Urgent Request. Violation of Indigenous Peoples’ Property Rights and
the Right to Effective Remedy, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ¶ 4 (Jan. 31, 2011)
https://archive.org/stream/PngUnsrip2011Final2ReducedSizeAnnexes/png-unsrip-2011-final2-reducedsize-annexes_djvu.txt.
136 G.A. Res. 34/92, ¶ 3 (Dec. 12, 1979).
137 See supra, section IIIb.
138 See THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, Human Rights, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 8 (2007).
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the interpretation of international law.139 These include General Assembly
Resolutions, both before and after the drafting of the Covenants, and the
statements of the Covenants’ respective monitoring bodies.140 Consideration
here has also been given to other regional human rights agreements and their
treaty bodies, as these are treated, by the ICJ at least, as subsidiary means of
determining the rules of international law.141
Attending to all of these sources demonstrates that the general right of
peoples over their natural resources is best understood as a set of rights,
corresponding to three broad categories of state duties: substantive duties,
procedural duties, and remedial duties.
(1) Substantive rights require the state to use the territory’s natural
resources in ways that benefit citizens;
(2) procedural rights require states to act transparently, to provide
public information regarding resource management, and to ensure
participatory decision-making; and
(3) remedial rights require the state to pursue asset recovery in cases
where resources belonging to the people have been wrongfully expatriated.
The content of these rights is now explored in more detail.
A. Substantive Rights
The principle that states owe a duty to their citizens to manage natural
resources for their benefit has been affirmed throughout the post-war period.
This duty has frequently been asserted as a corollary of the right to permanent
sovereignty over natural resources. Article 1 of the 1962 Resolution on
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources specifies that “the right of
peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and
resources must be exercised in the interests of their national development
and the well-being of the people of the state concerned.”142 Similarly, Article
5 of the 1966 Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources
requires that states pay due regard to the development needs and objectives

139

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 31, opened for signature May
23, 1969 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
140 See, e.g., Guinea v. DRC, supra note 108, ¶ 66: The ICJ stated that “it should ascribe great weight
to the interpretation adopted by this independent body that was established specifically to supervise the
application of that treaty. The point here is to achieve the necessary clarity and the essential consistency
of international law, as well as legal security, to which both the individuals with guaranteed rights and
the states obliged to comply with treaty obligations are entitled.” Id. While the ICJ was referring to the
HRC, similar reasoning could apply to the CESCR.
141 Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38 ¶ 1(d),
June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055.
142 G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), supra note 31, art. 1.
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of the people concerned.143 Article 2 of the 1970 Resolution on Permanent
Sovereignty over Natural Resources of Developing Countries and Expansion
of Domestic Sources of Accumulation for Economic Development says that
nations and peoples must exercise their rights over natural resources for the
well-being of the people of the state concerned.144
In these early texts, the duty of the state to manage natural resources for
the people’s “well-being” or “developmental needs” is firm but vague. It is
left unspecified what aspects of citizens’ “well-being” must be attended by
the state, and how much benefit is owed to the people from resource
exploitation. Without further clarification, exactly what these duties require
of states regarding the management of a country’s resources would have
been uncertain.
The language of the major human rights instruments provides this
clarification along two dimensions. First, the human rights Covenants
specify that states have a duty to prioritize the potential of natural resource
exploitation to provide citizens with means of subsistence. Second, both the
Covenants and the African Charter require that the benefits of resource
exploitation be used only for the benefit of the people. Thus, on the first
dimension, the treaties define a “floor” of citizen well-being: the benefits of
resource exploitation must first be used to provide citizens with means of
subsistence. On the second dimension, the treaties define a “wall” that states
must respect: all of the benefits of resource exploitation must be devoted to
public uses, not to other uses.
Beginning with the “floor” that requires priority to citizens’
subsistence, recall the unequivocal language of the final sentence of common
Article 1(2) of the Covenants: “In no case may a people be deprived of its
own means of subsistence.”145 This language requires that benefits accruing
from a state’s natural resources must first be directed toward securing
citizens’ most basic needs, now and in the future. Any other use of these
benefits, until this floor is reached, will deprive the people of its own means
of subsistence.
Moreover, state parties to the ICESCR are required under Article 2(1)
to take steps “to the maximum of its available resources” to achieve the
realization of the rights in that Covenant.146 This means that “governments
must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources at their
disposal to satisfy, as a matter of priority, their minimum core human rights

143
144
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obligations, which include making sure that their fiscal regimes are adequate
to support such progressive realization of human rights.”147
This “floor” interpretation, which requires the exploitation of a nation’s
resources be devoted first to meeting the basic needs of the nation’s people,
is supported by the travaux préparatoires (drafting history) of the Covenants.
Discussing the proposed language in Article 1(2), the delegate from El
Salvador gave the following example of a case where a people was being
deprived of its own means of subsistence: “In Nauru the only source of
national wealth, phosphates, was being unwisely overexploited by a British
company, with the result that in about 50 years’ time the population of the
island would have to be resettled elsewhere because no resources would
remain.”148
This Nauru example is particularly revealing, because it shows that
actions stretching over a long period (the overexploitation of phosphates for
fifty years) can violate people’s resource rights if the people will lack means
of subsistence after that time. Presumably, the violation of the people’s
resource rights will be a matter of even greater urgency in cases where
resources are being exploited in ways that currently leave citizens beneath
the level of subsistence. The Nauru example also shows that the relevant
resources are not limited to food and water, but also include resources whose
exploitation yields a “source of national wealth” that can provide citizens
with the means to subsist.149
In SERAC v. Nigeria, the African Commission begins with a general
analysis of the state obligations imposed by the resource rights guaranteed
under the African Charter.150 At the primary level, the Commission finds the
state obligation to respect fundamental rights, and in particular that “the state
is obliged to respect the free use of resources owned or at the disposal of the
individual alone or in any form of association with others . . . And with
regard to a collective group, the resources belonging to it should be
respected, as it has to use the same resources to satisfy its needs.”151 In
interpreting the state duty to fulfill fundamental rights like this one, the

147 Gilbert, supra note 18, at 86. A 2015 ECJ ruling that annulled an EU-Morocco trade deal further
supports the principle that resource exploitation must benefit and not infringe the fundamental rights of
the population of that territory. See Case T-512/12, Front Populaire pour la Liberation de la Saguia-ElHamra et du Rio de Oro (Front Polisario) v. Council, EU:T:2015:953 ¶¶ 208–09, 227–29.
148 U.N. GAOR, 10th Sess., 3d Comm.: 674th mtg., UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.674, ¶ 8 (Nov. 28, 1955).
The Nauru example was of a national people under colonial domination, yet as shown above, the resource
rights of peoples persist after independence.
149 On the legal texts concerning the deprivation of peoples directly to access to food and water, see
Gilbert, supra note 18, at 93–97.
150 SERAC v. Nigeria, supra note 76.
151 Id. ¶ 45.
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Commission says that this means “a positive expectation on the part of the
state to move its machinery towards the actual realisation of the rights . . . .
It could consist in the direct provision of basic needs such as food or
resources that can be used for food (direct food aid or social security).”152
Thus states have an obligation to use natural resources or resource revenues
to secure a “floor” of the people’s subsistence needs.
The “wall” dimension of the substantive rights of peoples requires that
all of the proceeds of resource exploitation benefit the people, not other
parties. This wall is marked in the final substantive article of both Covenants,
which characterizes peoples’ resource rights in this way: “Nothing in the
present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the inherent right of all
peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and
resources.”153
The benefits of the country’s resources must be fully devoted to public
purposes. Any use of these benefits where the people are not the primary
beneficiaries will violate the right of a people to the full enjoyment of their
natural wealth.
This “wall” dimension of a people’s substantive resource rights is also
affirmed in the African Charter, which states in Article 21 that: “All peoples
shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. This right shall be
exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall a people be
deprived of it.”154
The insistence on the exercise of resource rights in the exclusive interest
of the people is reaffirmed later in the same article, in the context of foreign
exploitation: “State parties to the present Charter shall undertake to eliminate
all forms of foreign exploitation, particularly that practiced by international
monopolies so as to enable their peoples to fully benefit from the advantages
derived from their national resources.”155
In its Angola communication, the African Commission highlights that
peoples can be beneficiaries of the right in Article 21 to the extent that the
Article imposes a duty on the state “to ensure that resources are effectively
managed for the sole and equal benefit of the entire peoples of the state.”156
And as the Commission stated in 2017, “[u]nderlying the right of peoples to
freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources is the principle that the

152
153
154
155
156

62

Id. ¶ 47.
ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 25.
OAU, supra note 75, art. 21(1) (emphasis added).
Id. art. 21(5) (emphasis added).
Angola, supra note 122, ¶ 131.

19:30 (2020)

Northwestern Journal of Human Rights

use of natural resources should be for the exclusive interest and benefit of
the citizens of a State.”157
The multifarious modalities of state resource management may in some
cases leave it uncertain whether either the “floor” or the “wall” of the
people’s substantive rights are being breached. Yet some cases that breach
the floor or the wall are beyond doubt. As Cassese says:
Article 1(2) can have an impact in extreme situations, where it is relatively
easy to demonstrate that a government is exploiting the natural resources
in the exclusive interest of a small segment of the population and is thereby
disregarding the needs of the vast majority of its nationals. Similarly, it may
be invoked with some success where it is apparent that a government has
surrendered control over its natural resources to another State or to foreign
private corporations without ensuring that the people will be the primary
beneficiaries of such an arrangement. Either of these situations would
constitute a clear violation of Article 1(2) of the Covenants.158

B. Procedural Rights
Beyond substantive rights, contemporary interpretations of peoples’
rights to natural resources have also added procedural rights regarding
natural resource management. Already in 1974, Article 7 of the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States made clear that every state has the
responsibility to “ensure the full participation of its people in the process and
benefits of development.”159 This is the historical transition point between
the older focus on the duty of states to use natural resources for the benefit
of their people and a newer emphasis on the state duty to ensure participation
by the citizenry.
The duty to ensure participation was significantly elaborated by the
General Assembly in its 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development.160
Article 1(2) of the Declaration reintroduces the concept of peoples’
permanent sovereignty over natural resources, which had lain dormant since
Chile unsuccessfully proposed including language of peoples’ permanent
sovereignty over natural resources in the Covenants in 1952.161 Article 1(1)
157 ACHPR, supra note 17, at 20. The CESCR, the CERD, the African Court, the Inter-American
Court on Human Rights, the ILO, and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
have all affirmed the importance of the state sharing the benefits of resource exploitation with those
indigenous peoples who occupy the territory where the extraction is located. Since these subgroups are
part of the national people, these requirements do not violate the requirement that all benefits go to the
people.
158 Cassese, supra note 45, at 56.
159 G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), supra note 78, at 52.
160 G.A. Res. 41/128, supra note 78, ¶ 2.
161 Schrijver, supra note 27, at 53.
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states that the human right to development entitles every human person to
participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political
development. Similarly, Article 2(3) places a duty on states to develop
policies to improve the well-being of the entire population on the basis of
their active, free, and meaningful participation. Finally, Article 8(2) calls on
states to encourage popular participation in all spheres as an important factor
in development and in the full realization of human rights.
Simultaneous with the rise of citizens’ rights to participate in resource
decisions, parallel rights were being affirmed in cognate areas of the law and
especially with respect to the environment. For example, the Rio Declaration
of 1992 states that, “Each individual shall have appropriate access to
information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities . . .
and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes.”162 Such
participatory rights regarding environmental matters were further detailed in
the Aarhus Convention of 1998, now ratified by 47 parties in Europe and
Central Asia.163 The African Commission has also found that a people’s right
to a “general satisfactory environment favorable to their development” under
Article 24 of the African Charter requires states to make relevant
environmental information public and to give meaningful opportunities for
individuals to be heard and to participate in the development decisions that
affect their communities.164
Returning to citizens’ procedural rights over their natural resources
proper, the CESCR has provided significant guidance on the content of these
rights. While the CESCR has never provided a list of the specific procedural
duties that Article 1(2) requires, its numerous reports set out three procedural
duties that bind states in relation to natural resources.
First, the CESCR repeatedly calls on states to act with greater
transparency in their decision-making around natural resources. Referring to
Article 1(2), in its 1997 Concluding Observations on Azerbaijan, the CESCR
stresses the need for transparency, fairness, and accountability in relation to
the privatization of the country’s oil resources.165 Similarly, in its 2009
162 “States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making information
widely available. Effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and
remedy, shall be provided.” U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), annex I, principle 10 (June 3, 1992).
163 U.N. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access
to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention), June 25, 1998, 2161 U.N.T.S. 447. As Elena
Blanco and Jona Razzaque describe the Convention’s three pillars, they are duties on public authorities
to disclose environmental information, to take public participation into account in decision-making, and
to provide reasonable access to judicial remedies. See ELENA BLANCO & JONA RAZZAQUE,
GLOBALISATION AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 157–58 (2011).
164 SERAC v. Nigeria, supra note 76, ¶¶ 50, 53.
165 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Azerbaijan, supra note 110, ¶ 16.
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Concluding Observations on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the
CESCR criticizes the government’s lack of transparency around the review
process for new and existing mining contracts.166
Second, the CESCR emphasizes that the human rights framework
includes the right for those affected by decisions to participate in the relevant
decision-making process and specifically applies this right in relation to
Article 1(2).167 In its 2009 Concluding Observations on the DRC, the CESCR
urges the government to review mining contracts in a participatory fashion.168
It also encourages national debate on investment in agriculture in its 2009
Concluding Observations on Madagascar.169 As noted above, the CESCR’s
call for national accountability and debate in the Azerbaijan case shows that
participation is a right held by all the citizens of the state.
Third, the CESCR suggests that free and fair elections are a crucial
component of the right to participate. It also warns that such elections are not
sufficient to ensure that vulnerable citizens, such as those living in poverty,
will enjoy the right to participate in key decisions affecting their lives.170
Regional human rights agreements, and their implementation bodies,
also affirm the procedural rights of citizens over their natural resources. The
2004 Arab Charter on Human Rights declares in Article 2(1) that “All
peoples have the right of self-determination and control over their natural
wealth and resources.”171 As noted above, Article 21 of the African Charter
asserts the right of peoples to participate in the management of their natural
resources, echoing Article 1(2) of the ICESCR and ICCPR when it states
that, “[a]ll peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources.”
The African Commission, in its 2017 interpretation of the articles in the
African Charter related to extractives, requires that states “ensure that the
public is availed [of] adequate opportunities for consultation about [sic] rich
and rigorous participation in decision-making processes on plans for both
industrial exploration and extraction of natural resources.”172 More, in a rare
joint declaration, and one specifically on natural resource governance, the
Inter-American Commission and the African Commission affirmed the right
of access to information and to documents generated by the government, or
to which the government is a party, that are necessary for citizens to
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CESCR, Concluding Observations: Democratic Republic of Congo, supra note 111, ¶ 13.
CESCR, Poverty and the ICESCR, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/10, ¶ 12 (May 4, 2001).
CESCR, Concluding Observations: Democratic Republic of Congo, supra note 111, ¶ 13.
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understand the extent and value of their natural resources and the payments
for those resources received and disbursed by their governments.173
Finally, the transnational drive toward greater transparency around
natural resource extraction has been supported by state legislation, such as
the U.S. Dodd Frank Act, the European Union Accounting and Transparency
Directive, and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, as well
as by voluntary initiatives such as the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative and civil society coalitions such as Publish What You Pay.174
C. Remedial Rights
States have both substantive and procedural duties regarding citizens’
rights over resources, and violation of either of these types of rights may
trigger remedial state duties. The law regarding remedy is most extensively
developed in the African context, perhaps because of the unusually specific
language in the African Charter.175
As noted above, Article 21(1) of the African Charter provides for the
general right of peoples to their natural resources. In its Guidelines on Article
21, the African Commission has remarked that “the right to remedy is
inherent in and central to all human rights and is also embedded in the right
to access to justice.”176 Moreover, Article 21(2) provides a concrete remedial
right for people in relation to their natural resources, declaring that, “[i]n case
of spoliation[,] the dispossessed people shall have the right to the lawful
recovery of its property as well as to an adequate compensation.”177 While
the Commission has interpreted the language of spoliation primarily in terms
of the dispossession of land, it has not limited the language to this scenario.178
This requirement of a specific remedy may develop further into a tool for
ensuring adequate regard for people’s natural resource rights.

173 ACHPR, Resolution on a Human Rights-Based Approach to Natural Resources Governance (May
2, 2012), https://www.achpr.org/sessions/resolutions?id=243.
174 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929-Z,
124 Stat. 1376, 1871 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 780), secs. 1502, 1504; European Union, Directive
2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, EUR-LEX (Dec. 15, 2004), https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32004L0109; OECD, OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises, OECD.ORG (2011), http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf; EITI,
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, EITI.ORG, https://eiti.org/; Publish What You Pay,
PWYP.ORG, http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/.
175 A parallel jurisprudence on remedial rights is well-developed in the Inter-American system. See
Thomas M. Antkowiak, Rights, Resources, and Rhetoric: Indigenous Peoples and the Inter-American
Court, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 113 (2014).
176 ACHPR, supra note 17, ¶ 15.
177 African Charter, supra note 75, art. 21.
178 ACHPR, supra note 17, ¶ 15.
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Additionally, in terms of state reporting requirements, the African
Commission requires state parties to report on their grievance mechanisms
for violations of any of the Charter’s rights. In the context of the extractive
industries, the Commission requires states to report on their judicial and nonjudicial complaints mechanisms to adjudicate grievances, to report on their
provision of legal aid to enable access to those mechanisms, and to publish
statistics on how extensively these mechanisms are being used.179
As this section has shown, the regional human rights bodies such as the
African Commission and the Inter-American Commission have been
particularly concerned to fill in the detail of peoples’ substantive, procedural,
and remedial resource rights. Since human rights jurisprudence from these
regional institutions is based on principles of cross-pollination and crossfertilization, the jurisprudence developed by these regional institutions will
have resonance in other jurisdictions across the globe.180 Moreover, as the
ICJ has argued, just as it ascribes great weight to the interpretations of the
ICCPR by the HRC, it must for the same reasons take account of the regional
bodies of their respective treaties. Respecting the interpretation of all human
rights institutions “achieve[s] the necessary clarity and the essential
consistency of international law, as well as legal security, to which both the
individuals with guaranteed rights and the States obliged to comply with
treaty obligations are entitled.”181 For the sake of the rule of law in
international affairs, the detailed interpretations of human rights developed
by these human rights institutions should set the standard against which
alternative interpretations can be measured.
V. THE FUTURE OF CITIZENS’ RESOURCE RIGHTS
This article has discussed the bases in international law for affirming
peoples’ rights over natural resources as one dimension of peoples’ right to
self-determination. Three types of groups hold such rights. Peoples living
under colonial occupation or trusteeship hold the rights against exploitation
of their natural resources. Indigenous peoples hold rights over the natural
resources located in their ancestral territories, including a right to exercise
their free, prior, and informed consent before any development takes place
on their lands and territories, and respect for the cultural rights connected to
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TRIBUNALS (Arman Sarvarian et al. eds., 2015); TOWARDS CONVERGENCE IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW: APPROACHES OF REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS (Carla Buckley, Alice Donald,
& Philip Leach eds., 2016).
181 Guinea v. DRC, supra note 108, ¶¶ 66–67.
180

67

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

the use of their territory’s resources. All citizens of independent states have
rights (subject to both a “floor” and a “wall”) to benefit from the exploitation
of the territory’s natural resources. They also have rights to meaningful
participation in decision-making over these resources, and rights to access
remedies in case these rights are not fulfilled.
The rights of peoples over natural resources correspond to significant
state obligations and duties toward their citizens. For example, the African
Commission says that state parties to the African Charter have general
obligations to recognize the rights enshrined in the Charter and to adopt
legislative or other measures to give them effect. This implies specific duties
to incorporate Charter-based rights into national laws, to ensure effective and
adequately resourced institutions to supervise and enforce the corresponding
standards, and to provide administrative and juridical mechanisms for
seeking redress. States must also adopt beneficial legislation controlling all
aspects of revenue generation from the extractive industries, including
transparency over all systems that manage concessions and measures to
prevent illicit financial flows.182
States may fail in their duties toward peoples through omission or
commission, and failures to respect peoples’ rights often occur because of
weak regulatory regimes in the extractive sector. As the African Commission
said in 2017, weak regulation can result in “human rights abuses [such as]
lack of transparency about and egregious abuse by national actors of
revenues received from the extractive industries.”183 The Commission adds
that peoples must be “provided with the legal guarantee to participate in the
prospecting and development” of major extractive resources, and that “[t]he
right to share in the benefits derived from the development or sale of natural
resources extends to all peoples of a state.”184 State duties to respect peoples’
resource rights thus demand extensive and proactive state action.
An important issue is how this legal approach bears on corporations and
other private actors that exploit natural resources. Corporate responsibilities
to respect peoples’ rights over natural resources form an emerging legal
regime. The CESCR has affirmed states’ obligations to take steps to prevent
human rights abuses by corporations based in their jurisdiction, which has
been echoed in an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice.185
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This set of state obligations is set out most comprehensively in the UN
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, endorsed by the Human
Rights Council in 2011.186 The Guiding Principles also provide substantial
detail on corporate responsibilities to respect human rights. The Guiding
Principles encourage companies to conduct human rights impact
assessments of their activities and to act with due diligence to avoid
infringing those rights.187 While the Guiding Principles are not legally
binding, the HRC has established a working group to draft a corresponding
binding treaty. This working group is developing ever-more sophisticated
versions of this treaty.188 A binding treaty would have significant impacts on
states’ understanding of their duties toward citizens with regard to natural
resources and the obligations of companies in the extractive industries.
Moreover, jurisprudence is increasingly emerging from human rights
institutions on the intersection of human rights obligations, corporations, and
natural resources. The African Commission has done the most to specify the
obligations of corporations with regard to the extraction of natural
resources.189 The Commission sets out a suite of corporate obligations
corresponding to the rights recognized in the African Charter.190 The first is
an obligation to do no harm and take due care, which requires mechanisms
for rectifying negative human rights impacts and for ensuring responsible
supply chain management.191 The second is an obligation for firms to respect
all applicable fiscal and transparency obligations, and to inform and consult
with the peoples affected by their operations.192 Additionally, as noted above,
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion,
2004 I.C.J. 131, ¶ 112 (July 9).
186 Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises,
A/HRC/RES/17/4, ¶ 4 (July 6, 2011). John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on
the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises), Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and
Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Guiding Principles]. See
also ETO Consortium, Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ¶¶ 24–27, https://www.etoconsortium.org/nc/en/mainnavigation/
library/maastricht-principles/?.
187 Guiding Principles, supra note 186, ¶¶ 17–24.
188 See Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with respect to Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER, https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/wgtranscorp/pages/igwgontnc.aspx; 6th Session
of the IGWG, BUSINESS AND HUMAN RESOURCE CENTRE, http://www.business-humanrights.org/en/
binding-treaty (last visited Mar. 2, 2021).
189 ACHPR, supra note 17, ¶ 56.
190 Id. ¶¶ 57–64.
191 Id. ¶¶ 57–62.
192 Id. ¶¶ 63–64. The African Commission’s Niamey Declaration, supra note 128, art. 1(e, f, h),
requests state parties to the African Charter to have legislation in place that makes the terms of
concessionary contracts and the independent audits of all revenues received under them public
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the Commission insists that a people’s right freely to dispose of its natural
resources is inviolable, and that states have only a delegated role in the
exercise of this right. Given the Commission’s detailed cataloguing of the
substantial, procedural, and remedial rights that follow from this inviolable
right, it appears that the Commission also sees corporations as bound to
respect these rights of peoples where the rights bear on their conduct, on pain
of criminal liability.193
A. Reforms to Lift the Resource Curse
Peoples’ rights over resources are stated clearly in law and mostly not
respected in fact. All of the reforms to laws and practices discussed so far
have concerned the states where natural resources are extracted. Yet much,
perhaps most, of the progress needed to secure peoples’ rights over their
resources can be made outside of the countries of extraction.
Around the world, it is the countries of extraction that are the sites
where the “inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely
their natural wealth and resources” are violated.194 However, many of the
legal reforms needed to counter such violations can be implemented in other
states, and especially in the major economies of North America, Europe, and
Asia. These states are the home states of the major extractive corporations,
and so control the standards by which these corporations interact with state
officials, indigenous peoples, and armed groups in countries of extraction.
Moreover, these major economies are also the main importers of natural
resources and the main sources of resource revenues going into countries of
extraction. By making it legal for their persons to purchase natural resources
from corrupt, violent, and oppressive actors in countries of extraction,
importing states are today contributing to, and indeed sometimes sustaining,
the continuing violation of the resource rights of peoples. To lift the resource
information, and that imposes criminal and administrative accountability on corruption within the
extractive industries. Further, the Niamey Declaration Preamble affirms that the “extractive industries
have the legal obligation to respect the rights guaranteed in the African Charter,” and expresses alarm at
the “low respect of human and peoples’ rights in the extractive industries sector resulting in extensive
individual and collective human rights violations.”
193 On corporate criminal liability, the African Commission quotes the Malabo Protocol of 2014,
specifically its Article relating to natural resources. African Union, Protocol on Amendments to the
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, art. 28L Bis at 32-33 (June 27,
2014) https://au.int/en/treaties/protocol-amendments-protocol-statute-african-court-justice-and-humanrights. The Malabo Protocol will come into effect when it has 15 state parties; at the time of this writing
there are 11. According to the Commission, acts triggering corporate criminal liability include concluding
an agreement to exploit natural resources through corrupt practices, or concluding an agreement that is
clearly one-sided, or that violates the legal procedures of the state concerned. Also triggering criminal
liability is, the Commission says, “concluding an agreement to exploit resources, in violation of the
principles of peoples’ sovereignty over their natural resources.” ACHPR, supra note 17, ¶ 60.
194 ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 47; ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 25.
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curse, this must change. In discussing methods for change, we take up
corporate home-state regulation and the laws of resource-importing states in
turn.
B. Realizing Peoples’ Rights to Their Natural Resources: Home States
Regulations
On corporate regulation, it is noteworthy that the major instruments to
which many corporations and investors have already committed themselves
require respect for “internationally recognized human rights.” These
instruments include the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights, the UN Global Compact, and the Equator Principles for financial
institutions.195 Were the substantive, procedural, and remedial rights
described above to receive more international recognition, this would require
corporations and investors committed to these instruments to evaluate, for
example, whether a potential extractive project would break the “wall” of
peoples’ rights by directing resource revenues to corrupt officials who would
use the funds for non-public purposes. Respect for peoples’ rights might also
require corporations to evaluate whether a potential project would exploit the
resources of the territory beyond any possible accountability to the citizens.
While many corporations and investors currently screen projects for
corruption, few evaluate projects on their broader state accountability to
citizens.196 Evaluating and potentially rejecting potential extractive projects
on this basis would require significant changes in their business practices.
Some corporations and investors do want to integrate human rights into
their operational decisions. However, they also want regulations to be
enforced equally on their competitors, and (especially in the extractive
industries, where projects span years or even decades) they need clarity and
predictability over how regulations will be applied. Stronger affirmation of
citizens’ human rights over their natural resources—for example, by the
treaty bodies that oversee the Covenants—would increase pressures from
business and finance for their home states to standardize the requirements
for respect of these rights across competing firms, ideally with multilateral
standardization and enforcement across all firms’ home states. A historical
parallel from the 1970s is the pressure that the private sector put on states to
create multilateral standards for export credit agencies. This corporate
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pressure resulted in today’s OECD and WTO regulatory instruments that
create a “level playing field” for states’ financial support for their firms
operating abroad.197
Corporations are legal creations of their home states, and the regulatory
standards of their home states can have great influence over which and how
extractive projects proceed abroad. An illustration of the development of
such home-state standards in a related domain is prohibitions on corporate
bribery of foreign officials. Until the 1970s, no state regulated their firms’
bribery of foreign officials; in some states, such bribes were even taxdeductible.198 Starting with the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977,
major states began to pass anti-bribery legislation binding their own
corporations.199 Coordination of these domestic laws was guided by OECD
multilateral standards. All OECD member states have now passed antibribery laws, and these laws appear to have reduced bribery compared to
nonmember states.200 A broader multilateral instrument, the UN Convention
Against Corruption, came into force in 2005 and now counts 186 state
parties.201
Robust affirmation of the rights of citizens over natural resources
should reinforce this existing anti-corruption regime. Home-state regulation
of firms against making corrupt deals for natural resources can be
characterized as protecting the “wall” of human rights that requires the
disposition of natural resources to be made “in the exclusive interest of the
people,” instead of in the private interest of officials.202 The addition of this
human rights argument—based on the principle of self-determination of
peoples, to which the great preponderance of states are committed—adds

197 See EXPORT CREDITS, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/trade/topics/export-credits/ (last visited
Mar. 6, 2021); Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, WTO, https://www.wto.org/
english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm_01_e.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2021).
198 Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L. J. 929, 929–1014
(2012).
199 John Ashcroft & John Ratcliffe, The Recent and Unusual Evolution of an Expanding FCPA, 26
NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 25, 25 (2012).
200 On the OECD Convention, see OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/corruption/
oecdantibriberyconvention.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2021). On compliance, see Jensen & Malesky, supra
note 196.
201 See United Nations Convention against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4 (Oct. 31, 2003). The OECD
has been attempting to persuade China in particular to join its more rigorous anti-corruption regime.
Michael Griffiths, OECD Wooing China to Sign Anti-Bribery Convention, GLOBAL INVESTIGATIONS
REV. (Aug. 17, 2018), https://globalinvestigationsreview.com/article/1173227/oecd-wooing-china-tosign-anti-bribery-convention.
202 African Charter, supra note 75, art. 21.
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weight to calls for stronger home-state regulation of corporate corruption
abroad.203
Respect for the resource rights of citizens requires firms to evaluate
more broadly whether a potential project would exploit the territory’s
resources beyond any possible accountability to the people. As above, the
procedural rights of citizens include rights to transparency and participation
regarding the disposition of the territory’s natural resources. For a
corporation to remove resources from the territory under a non-transparent
agreement with an unaccountable state or non-state actor would violate these
procedural rights. Respect for the human right of self-determination thus
requires firms not to make resource deals with authoritarian regimes or
armed groups. Taking the propertarian language of the international
instruments seriously, firms should not make deals for stolen goods—goods
stolen from the people.
This conclusion, though seemingly inevitable in theory, immediately
raises the question of how transparency and accountability could be
measured with the clarity and certainty that the extractive industries need for
planning their projects. How could companies evaluate whether any actor is
transparent and accountable enough to the people to deal with, without fear
of violating the rights of citizens “to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their
natural wealth and resources”?204 These might appear to be questions that go
beyond the competence of businesses to answer individually and to agree on
collectively.
The minimal requirements of transparency and accountability to
citizens are not difficult to frame in the abstract.205 To be able to hold their
government accountable for its resource management, citizens must have at
least bare-bones civil liberties and political rights. First, citizens must be able
to find out what the government is doing with the territory’s resources and
where the resource revenues are going. Second, citizens must be able to
discuss and peacefully protest what the government is doing without
reasonable fear of losing their jobs, freedoms, or lives. Third, if a majority
203 Whatever the realities of its policies, China is ideologically a “people’s republic,” based on the
principle of both external and internal self-determination of peoples, as can be seen in the first paragraph
of the Chinese constitution: “Feudal China was gradually reduced after 1840 to a semi-colonial and semifeudal country. The Chinese people waged wave upon wave of heroic struggles for national independence
and liberation and for democracy and freedom . . . After waging hard, protracted, and tortuous struggles,
armed and otherwise, the Chinese people of all nationalities led by the Communist Party of China with
Chairman Mao Zedong as its leader ultimately, in 1949, overthrew the rule of imperialism, feudalism and
bureaucrat capitalism, won the great victory of the new-democratic revolution and founded the People’s
Republic of China. Thereupon the Chinese people took state power into their own hands and became
masters of the country.” CHINA [CONSTITUTION] 1982, Pmbl.
204 ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 47; ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 25.
205 See Wenar, supra note 13, at 225–30.
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of citizens strongly disagree with the government’s management of the
country’s resources, then government policy must change to reflect this
within a reasonable time.
These standards are not impossibly high; not every oil-exporter needs
to be Norway to be above this rather low baseline. Moreover, there are
respected independent metrics that evaluate all states on whether they are
“above the line” on the relevant rights and liberties.206 Possible biases in these
metrics can be balanced out by combining them into a “‘metrics of metrics,”
which have already been developed.207 Using such a combined metric to
evaluate which states are at least minimally accountable to citizens finds that
states like Nigeria and Kuwait are “above the line” of public accountability,
while autocracies and failed states like Turkmenistan and South Sudan are
below it.208 Perhaps surprisingly, the clarity and predictability required for
evaluating respect for citizens’ procedural rights over their natural resources
are attainable.
Nevertheless, it might strain credulity to believe that extractive
corporations and investors will by themselves coordinate sufficiently to
pressure their home states to impose common standards to respect this aspect
of peoples’ resource rights. After all, these standards would restrict the set
of states in which these companies could do business. Much of the initiative
to set such standards would need to come from states themselves. States must
come to understand that their obligation to respect the self-determination of
peoples, which most states have historically committed to uphold, requires
significant changes in their domestic law. This is precisely why the human
rights-based approach to citizens’ rights to natural resources is so important
to these debates on transparency and accountability. It adds the legal and
moral elements that have been missing so far in international discussions of
these issues.

206 Transparency and accountability are measured, for example, by sub-indices of the World Bank’s
Worldwide Governance Index, by the indices published by the Economist Intelligence Unit, Freedom
House, Transparency International, and others. See Daniel Kaufmann & Aart Kraay, Worldwide
Governance Indicators, WORLD BANK, https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ (last visited Mar. 6,
2021); Democracy Index 2020, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracyindex (last visited Mar. 6, 2021); Freedom House, supra note 1; Transparency International, supra note
2.
207 See Wenar, supra note 13, at 284–87; CLEAN TRADE, http://www.cleantrade.org/investors (last
visited Mar. 6, 2021) (explaining the Clean Trade Governance Index).
208 Id.
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C. Realizing Peoples’ Rights to their Natural Resources: Importing State
Laws
The legal changes required for states to respect peoples’ resource rights
go beyond the regulation of their own corporations. The deepest domestic
reform required for the self-determination of peoples concerns the legality
of resource imports. States that import natural resources have sovereign
authority over where it will be legal for their persons to source those
resources. How states decide to exercise this sovereign authority can be
decisive for whether peoples’ rights over their resources will be respected or
violated in the countries of extraction, as can be seen by reviewing the
dynamics of today’s resource curse.
Natural resources such as petroleum, metals, and gems are concentrated
sources of economic value that can be extracted from relatively small and
easily-secured sites. Under today’s legal regime, the default rule of all states
is for it to be legal for their persons to purchase resources from whatever
state (and sometimes non-state) actor controls the territory where the
extraction site is located.209 This means that whoever controls resource-rich
territory can receive substantial (and sometimes immense) revenues from
selling the resources of that territory to foreigners. In essence, whoever can
keep coercive control over some holes in the ground can get rich.210
In many resource-rich countries, a regime that can keep control over oil
wells or mineral mines can get the funds it needs for the coercion or
clientelism that will keep it in power. Examples include the governments of
Azerbaijan (oil) and Zimbabwe (diamonds).211 For non-state actors, an armed
group that can seize extraction sites can get the funds it needs to start or
escalate a civil conflict. Examples have been ISIS (oil) and the militants in
the eastern Congo (metals).212 For both state and non-state actors, what is
notable about the power they gain from resource revenues is that this power
comes with no accountability. Unlike foreign loans from banks, resource
revenues need never be paid back. Unlike aid from foreign allies, resource
revenues arrive with no conditions attached. Most significantly, resource
revenues flow to state and non-state actors beyond accountability to the
209 For example, when Saddam Hussain’s junta took over Iraq in a coup in 1968, it became legal for
the persons of all states to buy Iraq’s oil from that junta. When ISIS took over some of those same wells
in 2014, it became legal to buy Iraq’s oil from ISIS. (Some importing states then imposed sanctions on
ISIS, which made it illegal for their persons to buy oil from ISIS.) Wenar, supra note 25.
210 Id.
211 For examples of recent reporting on governance in Azerbaijan and Zimbabwe, see Radio Free
Europe, Critics Say Azeri Petrodollars Mask Poverty and Oppression (Apr. 9, 2019),
https://www.rferl.org/a/azerbaijan-critics/29870317.html;
Zimbabwe,
GLOBAL
WITNESS,
https://www.globalwitness.org/tagged/zimbabwe/ (last visited May 10, 2021).
212 Wenar, supra note 13, at 49, 54–55.
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people. Resource-empowered actors typically do not need a healthy,
educated, or politically engaged population to gain the revenues that keep
them in power. Indeed, resource revenues can even continue to flow during
widespread civil conflict, as in Libya after the fall of Gaddafi.213
Under the current transnational legal regime, large resource revenues
go to state and non-state actors who are entirely unaccountable to their
citizens for the management of those resources. In many countries, these
revenues enable these actors to abuse and neglect citizens, often while
enriching themselves. This helps explain the correlations with which we
began: today, most authoritarian regimes, highly corrupt regimes, civil wars,
and hunger crises are in resource-rich states; most refugees have been fleeing
from these states, and ever-more of the world’s extreme poverty is located
in these states.214 In many resource-rich states, citizens can only watch as the
natural resources of their country are extracted and sold off by actors who
will use the revenues further to oppress, attack, or impoverish them. This is
the resource curse.
The revenues that empower unaccountable actors in resource-exporting
states come from resource-importing states. Yet this need not remain so;
every sovereign state has the right to determine from whom it will be legal
for its persons to buy resources.215 It is within the legal authority of sovereign
states to stop resource revenues from flowing from them to state and nonstate actors who are not minimally accountable to citizens for exports. There
will be practical considerations for individual states that want to stop such
flows, such as energy security and diplomatic relations with traditional allies.
Yet the legal authority itself is not in question.
It might be asked why states would consider exercising this authority.216
A different perspective asks how they could justify not doing so. Recall the
repeated affirmation of the people’s resource rights in the Covenants:
All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth
and resources . . . In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of
subsistence. Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as
213

Irene Costantini, Conflict Dynamics in Post-2011 Libya, 5 CONFLICT SEC. & DEV. 405 (2016).
See supra, notes 2–6.
215 In 2011, for instance, the United States made it illegal for its persons to buy petroleum from the
Libyan government; and in 2016 it prohibited transactions with the senior oil official of ISIS. Exec. Order
No. 13566, 31 C.F.R. §570 Appendix A (July 1, 2011); Treasury Sanctions Key ISIL Leaders and
Facilitators Including a Senior Oil Official, US DEPT. TREASURY (Feb. 11, 2016),
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0351.aspx.
216 The economic and diplomatic feasibility of states in North America and Europe tapering off oil
imports from exporters that lack minimal accountability to citizens is discussed in LEIF WENAR ET AL.,
BEYOND BLOOD OIL: PHILOSOPHY, POLICY, AND THE FUTURE 18–23 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishing
Grp. Inc. 2018).
214
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impairing the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and
freely their natural wealth and resources.217

Both articles of the Covenants use propertarian language: the resources
of a country are the people’s resources. As we have seen, this has been
interpreted as meaning that the resources are the people’s “birthright.” At
independence, the resources start out in the people’s hands, although they
may thereafter be privatized. Many national constitutions and laws use
similar propertarian language. If this language is accepted literally, then
anyone selling off a territory’s public resources without any possible
accountability to the owners of those resources, the citizens, is selling stolen
goods. Importing states that use their authority to stop their nationals from
buying resources from unaccountable resource vendors would be prohibiting
their nationals from buying stolen goods. These importing states would be
enforcing the property rights of peoples to their natural resources. Importing
states that reform their domestic law to prohibit their persons from buying
resources from unaccountable foreign actors would thus be correcting a flaw
in today’s global markets: a flaw that allows resources to be bought legally
from actors unaccountable to the owners of those resources. Reforming
importing states would be transforming a black market in stolen goods into
a genuine market where stolen goods cannot be purchased under color of
title. Brazil’s Senate is now considering legislation, phrased in exactly these
terms, that would reform its law in just this way.218
Finally, beyond these two types of reforms, stronger affirmation of
peoples’ resource rights may impact other areas of transnational law such as
investor-state relations. To see possible impacts on investor-state relations,
a parallel may be drawn to recent rulings regarding corruption.219 Some
international investment tribunals have held that investor-state contracts that
were obtained by corruption are either invalid or unenforceable. It has been
217

See ICCPR, supra note 19; ICESCR, supra note 19.
Senado Federal de Brasil, Projeto de Lei do Senado [Federal Senate of Brazil, Senate Bill] no.
460, de 2017. This legislation would prohibit Brazilian companies from importing oil from states that
violate the principle of popular sovereignty over natural resources and would prohibit Brazil’s national
oil company from entering into new contracts with the governments of such states. The legislation is
pending as of the time of this writing, March 2021.
219 See Sophie Nappert, Nailing Corruption: Thoughts for a Gardener, in THE PRACTICE OF
ARBITRATION 161 (P. Wautelet, T. Kruger, & G. Coppens eds., 2012); Hilmar Raeschke-Kessler &
Dorothée Gottwald, Corruption, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 586
(Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino, & Christoph Schreuer eds., 2008); Clara Reiner & Christoph
Schreuer, Human Rights and International Investment Arbitration, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 82 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, & Francesco
Francioni, eds., 2009); Bruno Simma, Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human Rights? 60
INT’L COMP. L. Q. 573 (2011).
218
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held that the anti-corruption norms affirmed in several international
instruments are a matter of international public policy, and so tribunals are
obliged to comply with these norms in their decisions.220 In one muchdiscussed decision, a tribunal found that an investor could not enforce a
contract because the state official that it had bribed to win the contract was
acting beyond his legitimate state functions, so that his actions could not be
imputed to the state itself.221 As two distinguished scholars have summarized
this line of reasoning, “corruption inducing an investment transaction
invalidates it, and . . . in such cases the loss lies where it falls.”222
Were citizens’ resource rights to become more consistently recognized,
the result would be a state appealing to a tribunal against the enforcement of
a contract for natural resource exploitation made between an investor and a
predecessor authoritarian regime. The state would allege that there was
“reasonable certainty” or “clear and convincing evidence” that the contract
had been concluded without the possible participation either of the relevant
indigenous peoples or of the citizens of the state.223 The contract, the claimant
state would argue, thus contradicts international public policy. A consistent
line of decisions by tribunals accepting this argument would increase respect
for peoples’ resource rights and further the security of future investor-state
agreements.224 The idea that corruption could lead tribunals to annul
investment contracts seemed merely theoretical a few years ago; as the
previous paragraph shows, this is now established practice. The law is now
waiting for lawyers to take parallel actions on citizens’ resource rights that
will turn legal theory into legal reality.
CONCLUSION
After their long historical development, the rights of peoples over their
natural resources are now ready for decisive international affirmation and
enforcement. The sooner this recognition is given, the better. Natural
resources are crucial for the cultural integrity and the survival of indigenous

220 See, e.g., Vladislav Kim et al. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/6 (1997)
(undecided on public policy argument); Joachim Drude, Fiat Iustitia, ne Pereat Mundus: A Novel
Approach to Corruption and Investment Arbitration, 35 J. INT’L ARB. 665 (2018). For a recent rejection
of an appeal to public policy in a commercial dispute, see Vantage Deepwater Co. v. Petrobras Am. Inc.,
No. 4:18-cv-02246, 2019 WL 2161037 (S.D. Tex., May 17, 2019).
221 World Duty Free Co. Ltd. v. Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7 ¶ 178 (Sep. 25, 2006).
222 James Crawford & Paul Mertenskötter, The Use of the ILC’s Attribution Rules in Investment
Arbitration, in BUILDING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: THE FIRST 50 YEARS OF ICSID 27, 37 (M.
Kinnear & G. R. Fischer et al. eds., 2015).
223 On the standard of proof related to economic crimes such as corruption, see Yarik Kryvoi,
Economic Crimes in International Investment Law, 67 INT’L COMP. L. Q. 577, 588–90 (2018).
224 For the parallel to the current decisions involving corruption, see id. at 596–97.
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peoples. Natural resources are also essential to secure the subsistence and the
economic health of national populations. Without sufficient accountability,
peoples can find that the revenues from their territory’s resources are being
spent without benefit to them or, in many cases, are even being used against
them. The shockingly high prevalence of authoritarianism, corruption,
poverty, and civil conflict in contemporary resource-rich states demonstrates
the dangers of a lack of public accountability. Respect for the rights of
peoples over their natural resources is essential for the resources of all states
to become a blessing instead of a curse.
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